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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 78A-4-103(2)G).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in dismissing OneGreatFamily.com's ("OGF") cause

of action for breach of contract for Ancestry .com' s ("Ancestry") failure to pay funds due
and owing under the contract when the contract provides for the payment of such funds
and when OGF specifically alleged that Ancestry had failed to make such payment?
a.

Standard of Review: In reviewing whether a district court properly

granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
ruling. Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, ilil 2, 8; 139 P.3d 1073. See
also, Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, iJ 9, 104 P.3d 1226.

b.

Preservation:

This issue was raised and preserved in OGF's

memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss, and also in OGF's
objection to the proposed order submitted to the trial court by Ancestry, which was
ultimately entered by the trial court. R. 142-152, 229-231.

- 1-

2.

Did the trial court err in dismissing OGF's cause of action for breach of

contract for Ancestry's failure to allow a meaningful contractual audit when the contract

bl

specifically provides for audit rights and when OGF alleged in its complaint that
Ancestry had failed to provide OGF with a meaningful audit opportunity?
a.

Standard of Review: In reviewing whether a district court properly

granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them

G

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
ruling.

Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266,

,r,r 2, 8;

139 P.3d 1073; see

also, Oakwood Vil!. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, iJ 9, 104 P.3d 1226.

b.

Preservation:

This issue was raised and preserved in OGF's

memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss, and also in OGF's
objection to the proposed order submitted to the trial court by Ancestry, which was
ultimately entered by the trial court. R. 142-152, 229-231.

3.

Did the trial court err in determining that the Marketing Agreement

unambiguously does not require the parties to market each other's subscription service
and therefore could not be breached, in spite of both the actual language of the contract
and the parties' years-long prior course of dealing?

-2-
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a.

Standard of Review:

"The question of whether a contract is

ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law. When determining whether
a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise,
the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely
on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience."
Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, 1 13. In reviewing whether a district court properly
granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
ruling. Id. at 112, 8; 139 P.3d 1073; see also, Oakwood, 2004 UT 101, 19.
b.

Preservation:

This issue was raised and preserved in OGF's

memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss. R. 142-152.

4.

Did the trial court err in determining that Ancestry had not breached the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing in refusing to market under the Marketing
Agreement because the trial court determined that the Marketing Agreement could not be
breached?
a.

Standard of Review:

"The question of whether a contract is

ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law. When determining whether
a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise,

-3-

the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely
on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience."
Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, ,r 13. In reviewing whether a district court property

granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the

w

appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
ruling. Id. at ,r,r 2, 8; see also, Oakwood, 2004 UT 101, ,r 9.
b.

Preservation:

This issue was raised and preserved m OGF's

memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss. R. 142-152.

5.

Did the trial court err in determining that no punitive damages were

available in this breach of contract matter in spite of the contract's language that punitive
damages are available in the event of willfulness or gross negligence and when such
conduct was specifically alleged in the complaint?
a.

Standard of Review: In reviewing whether a district court property

granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual allegations in
the complaint as true and interprets those facts and all inferences drawn from them
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, a trial court's
decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a question of law that the
appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
-4-

CJ

ruling. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266,

b.

Preservation:

11 2,

8; see also, Oakwood, 2004 UT 101,

This issue was raised and preserved in OGF's

memorandum in opposition to Ancestry's motion to dismiss. R. 135-36.
STATUTES, RULES OR ORDINANCES WHOSE INTEPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL

None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety.
In

April

2009,

Appellants

Z-Corp,

dba

OneGreatFamily.com

and

OneGreatFamily, LLC (hereinafter OGF) entered into a Marketing Agreement with
People Search Media, LLC (who operated Archives.com). R. 175.

The Marketing

Agreement provided for the joint marketing of each other's online businesses and for
profit sharing between the two companies. R. 172, 175. Marketing was specifically
contemplated within the "paid area" of the other's website. R. 172. During 2009 through
2012, both OGF and People Search Media, LLC promoted and marketed the other's
website within the "paid area" of the other's website pursuant to the Marketing
Agreement. R. 12. As alleged in the complaint, both OGF and People Search Media
LLC understood "paid area" to mean the area immediately after a new customer enters
their financial information to sign up for a new Archives.com or OneGreatFamily.com
subscription. R. 12. Specifically, after subscribing to Archives.com a new subscriber

-5-

would be presented with a page giving the subscriber an opportunity to also subscribe to
OneGreatFamily.com.

R. 12.

Additionally, OneGreatFamily.com was listed as an

~

available subscription service in the Archives.com Products Page, which was only
viewable by Archives.com subscription holders (i.e. current customers). R. 11.
Profit sharing under the Marketing Agreement was also spelled out.

People

Search Media, LLC would remit to OGF 40% of the subscription amount received
through an OGF subscription obtained through the Archives.com website, and would

W

retain the remaining 60% of the subscription amount (and vice versa). R. 11, 170. This
division of proceeds applies to both new subscriptions and subsequent renewal
subscriptions for returning customers who were originated pursuant to the Marketing
Agreement. R. 11, 170. OGF and People Search Media, LLC coordinated their efforts so
that

Archives.com

could

grant

immediate

access

to

a

new

subscriber

to

OneGreatFamily.com and would later remit the appropriate portion of the subscription
funds. R. 11-12. Both OGF and People Search Media, LLC were satisfied with the

c..;;

other's performance, expressed such satisfaction in writing, and both benefited due to the
nature of the Marketing Agreement. R. 150.
Then,

in August 2012,

Ancestry .com (hereinafter "Ancestry") acquired

Archives.com from People Search Media, LLC.

R. 11:

In connection with this

acquisition, Ancestry assumed the Marketing Agreement, extended its perfonnance
period, and expressly undertook the obligations contained therein.

R. 93.

Initially,

Ancestry continued to market OneGreatFamily.com within Archives.com in the same
manner as People Search Media, LLC had done. R. 11. However, after some time,
-6-
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subscriptions for OneGreatFamily.com declined significantly. R. 11. OGF discovered
that Ancestry had begun to inconsistently promote OneGreatFamily.com within the "paid
area" following a new subscription to Archives.com and instead was promoting other
website subscription services available through Ancestry's subsidiaries. R. 10-11. Also,
OGF noticed large discrepancies between the number of subscribers who were granted
new subscription access to the OneGreatFamily.com website through the Archives.com
website, and the amount of funds being remitted to OGF under the profit sharing
provision of the Marketing Agreement. R. 9. It appeared that there were up to 70,000
subscribers for which OGF had never received subscription funds from Ancestry. R. 9.
·...i)

Then, in May, 2014, Ancestry completely removed the subscription offer from the "paid
area" following a new subscription to Archives.com.

R. 10.

OneGreatFamily.com

subscriptions were also removed for a time from the Products Page of Archives.com. R.
10. OGF reached out to Ancestry to determine what precipitated this change and was
told that Ancestry was "reinterpreting" the meaning of the Marketing Agreement. Not
only did Ancestry.com cease its marketing activities, it also ceased remitting funds for
renewal subscriptions under the Marketing Agreement.

R.10-11.

Ancestry's actions

deviate from the prior understanding, performance, intent, and actual language of the
Marketing Agreement and clearly deviate from the prior course of dealing between OGF
and Ancestry.
Due to concerns regarding these issues, OGF sought to conduct an audit of
Ancestry pursuant to an audit provision contained within the Marketing Agreement. R. 9,
174. The Marketing Agreement provides that either party may conduct an audit to ensure

-7-

that the terms of the Marketing Agreement are being met. R. 174. OGF requested that
Ancestry permit it to perfonn the audit required under the contract. R. 9. However, as
the parties exchanged correspondence, Ancestry indicated that it would not allow
electronic access to its records and further indicated that it would not provide OGF access
to necessary infonnation to conduct an actual and meaningful audit. R. 9.
OGF filed suit in the Fourth District Court, of Utah County, State of Utah for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion,

G..i

tortious interference with prospective economic relations, and punitive damages. R. 114. Ancestry filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under U.R.C.P., Rule 12(b)(6)
arguing that the Marketing Agreement was unambiguous in its language that the parties
were under no obligation to market each other. R. 102-125. In opposing the motion to
dismiss, OGF argued the opposite.

Specifically, OGF argued that the Marketing

Agreement unambiguously required the parties to market each other. R. 135-152. And
alternatively, even if the Marketing Agreement is ambiguous on the parties' duty to
market each other, the parties' prior course of dealing and mutual understanding of the
meaning of the Marketing Agreement was sufficient to create a question of latent
ambiguity regarding the meaning and intent of the Marketing Agreement such that
dismissal of the complaint at that early stage of the litigation would be legal error. R.
135-152. OGF also noted and argued that the complaint also alleged breach of contract
for Ancestry's failure to remit funds payable under the contract, regardless of whether or
not there existed a duty to market each other, and Ancestry's failure to permit a
meaningful audit. R. 144-148. In other words, regardless of whether or not there was a
-8-

~

duty to market, OGF had properly articulated separate and actionable breach of contract
claims for failure to remit payment and failure to permit an audit. R. 144-148. OGF
further noted that if the contract had been breached under any of the theories set forth by
OGF, and Ancestry had committed any of these breaches with the intent to deprive OGF
from receiving the fruits of the contract, then Ancestry had also breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

R. 142-144.

Finally, OGF noted that the

contract contained a specific provision allowing for the imposition of punitive damages
against the breaching party in the event that the breach was due to gross negligence or
wilful misconduct.

R. 135-136, 174.

OGF had alleged wilful misconduct in its

complaint, and therefore noted that dismissal of the complaint would be improper in the
face of this affirmative allegation. R. 3, 135-136
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court rejected OGF's arguments and
granted Ancestry's motion to dismiss. R. 218-224. In granting the motion to dismiss, the
trial court never mentioned or addressed OGF's claims for breach of contract for failure
to remit payment and failure to permit a meaningful audit. R. 218-224. The trial court
seemed to focus completely on the question of whether there was a duty to market and
whether the Marketing Agreement was ambiguous regarding a duty to market. R. 218224.

Ultimately the trial court found that there was no duty to market under the

Marketing Agreement, and dismissed the whole complaint. R. 218-224. As the trial
court was preparing to enter a final order on the matter, OGF submitted an objection to
the trial court, noting that the trial court had failed to address the breach of contract
claims for failure to remit payment and failure to permit a meaningful audit. R. 229-231.
-9-

The trial court overruled the objection and entered a final order dismissing the complaint
in its entirety. R. 236-241. OGF filed a timely appeal1. R. 242-243.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

On appeal from a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss, the
appellate court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all
inferences therefrom in favor of the Plaintiff and Appellant. In this case, the trial court
erred in granting a motion to dismiss the entire complaint. The errors are myriad.
First, the trial court ignored the existence of two claims for breach of contract.
These, claims (for failure to make payment and failure to allow a contractual audit) were
clearly set forth in the complaint and clearly briefed in the opposition to the motion to
dismiss. Moreover, the claims were well-pied and represent viable causes of action. The
trial court ignored the existence of these claims and dismissed the whole complaint
anyway.
Second, the trial court erroneously determined that the Marketing Agreement (the
contract between the parties) did not contain within it a duty to market, and therefore
Ancestry's refusal to market was not a breach of contract. In reaching this conclusion,
the trial court negated multiple provisions in the contract, including a "best efforts"
provision (the trial court expressly concluded that "best efforts" can be no efforts), a
"shall perform" provision (the trial court expressly states that this provision is negated),
and a "Promote the other company's Complimentary Products" provision (which the trial
OGF does not appeal the trial court's dismissal of its conversion claim or its tortious
interference with prospective economic relations claim.
1

- 10 -
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court ignored and did not address even though it was briefed). The trial court should
have attempted to harmonize these provisions and give them effect rather than negating
them. In addition, the trial court failed to take into consideration the parties' intentions
and expectations and prior course of dealing when interpreting and determining the
meaning of the contract terms.
Third, the trial court erroneously concluded that Ancestry could exercise the
discretion granted to it under the Marketing Agreement on how to market so as to engage
in no marketing at all. However, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
prevents a party to a contract from exercising discretion in the performance of the
contract in such a way as to deprive the other party from receiving the fruits and benefits
of the contract. The trial court erred in endorsing Ancestry's actions depriving OGF from
the benefits and fruits of the contract and dismissing OGF's cause of action for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Finally, the trial court erred in dismissing the claim for punitive damages even
though the contract has an express provision allowing for punitive damages for breach of
contract in the event of willful misconduct, and such willful misconduct was expressly
alleged in the complaint. For these reasons, the decision of the trial court dismissing the
complaint should be reversed and the matter should be remanded back to the trial court.
ARGUMENT

In reviewing whether a district court properly granted a motion to dismiss, the
appellate court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interprets those
facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
- 11 -

party. Moreover, a trial court's decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is a
question of law that the appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to
the trial court's ruling.

Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266,

,r,r 2,

Gd

8; 139 P.3d

1073; see also, Oakwood Vil/. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ,r 9, 104 P.3d 1226.

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED OGF'S CLAIMS
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR ANCESTRY'S FAILURE TO REMIT
PAYMENT UNDER THE MARKETING AGREEMENT AND FAILURE TO
PERMIT A MEANINGFUL AUDIT UNDER THE CONTRACT.
The trial court erroneously dismissed OGF's well pied claims for breach of
contract for failure to make appropriate payments under the Marketing Agreement and
for breach of contract for failure to permit a meaningful audit. The trial court dismissed
these claims without ever acknowledging them or addressing them.
Under the Marketing Agreement,
[Ancestry] will pay to OGF a Revenue Share consisting of
40% of the Gross Revenues (net of returns and charge backs)
collected from any customer who is referred to OGF from
[Ancestry] and is subsequently billed by [Ancestry]. This
Revenue Share will apply to all payments made by such
customers for current membership subscriptions nor for any
future new product offering or services.
R. 170.
Thus, regardless of whether or not there is an obligation on either party to market the
other, if marketing occurs under the Marketing Agreement, then there is a clear
obligation to share revenues consistent with the revenue sharing provisions of the
Marketing Agreement. Ancestry is not permitted to sell subscriptions to OGF' s products
and just keep all the money. If Ancestry sells an OGF product, Ancestry must remit a

- 12 -

'1.1

portion of the revenue, consistent with the terms of the Marketing Agreement, regardless
of whether there is a duty to market or not.
In its complaint, OGF specifically alleged that "As the Parties have exchanged
subscription and payment information for thousands of customers, OGF has uncovered
information that between 20,000 and 70,000 payments from OneGreatFamily.com
customer subscriptions are missing that are due from Ancestry." R. 9. The complaint
goes on to state that, "Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement because, based on
information and belief, it has withheld payments for subscriptions that are due to OGF.
R. 8. This a clear and well pied allegation of breach of contract on the part of Ancestry
that is not dependent upon whether the Marketing Agreement contains within it a duty to
market.
The same is true of OGF's cause of action for breach of contract for Ancestry's
failure to permit a meaningful audit as permitted under the contract. The Marketing
Agreement has detailed language regarding each party's right to conduct an audit of the
other in relation to their marketing activities. R. 174. The Marketing Agreement has a
separate "Audit Rights" section which provides,
OGF shall have the right to send an employee or other party,
to [Ancestry's] offices to inspect [Ancestry's] records to the
extent reasonably necessary and solely for the purpose of
verifying [Ancestry's] records regarding customer sign-ups,
cancellations, and other infonnation material to the terms of
payment under the Marketing Program.
R. 174.
In its complaint, OGF alleges that "OGF demanded an audit of Ancestry's records" and
"Ancestry refused to honor OGF's request and instead offered only to allow OGF to
- 13 -

inspect some limited financial records that would not have enabled OGF to conduct a
meaningful and actual audit." R. 9.

The complaint goes on to say that, "Ancestry

~

breached the Marketing Agreement when it refused to comply completely with the terms
of the Audit Rights provision of the Marketing Agreement." R. 8. Again, this is a clear
and well pied allegation for breach of contract on the part of Ancestry that is not
dependent upon whether the Marketing Agreement contains within it a duty to market.
When Ancestry filed its motion to dismiss the entirety of the complaint on theory

G

that it had no duty to market under the Marketing Agreement, OGF pointed out in its
opposing memorandum that, "Plaintiffs have information that between 20,000 and 70,000
subscription payments are missing .... The facts alleged are sufficient to support a claim
for breach of the Marketing Agreement." R. 145. As to the audit rights breach, the
opposing memorandum states, "Defendants have failed to comply with the audit
provision of the Marketing Agreement." R. 145. And after some analysis, further asserts
that, "The Defendants refused to provide access to necessary information that would
allow the Plaintiffs to verify whether or not there were indeed missing subscription
payments. By refusing to provide access to sufficient infonnation to make the audit
meaningful, Defendants breached the Marketing Agreement." R. 144.
In other words, these two causes of action for breach of contract were squarely
before the trial court on the motion to dismiss.

They were clearly stated in the

complaint-they were clearly articulated and briefed in opposition to the motion to
dismiss. In spite of this, the trial court completely ignores the existence of these claims in
ruling on the motion to dismiss. There is no mention of them at all. R. 224. The claims
- 14 -

c..;.;

were well pied and stand independent of any duty to market under the Marketing
Agreement. Ancestry is not allowed to sell OGF's products and keep all the money.
Ancestry is not permitted to refuse to supply infonnation regarding all the OGF
subscriptions it has sold when the Marketing Agreement requires such information to be
disclosed through an audit right. These are clear causes of action that were squarely
before the trial court. The trial court never addressed them, and that was legal error.
After the trial court issued its ruling and as Ancestry had presented its proposed
order reflecting the trial court's ruling, OGF filed an objection to the proposed order
which specifically pointed out to the trial court its error in never addressing these separate
claims. OGF stated,
Not only did Plaintiffs bring a cause of action for breach of
contract on the theory that the Defendants had failed to
appropriately market under the requirements of the Marketing
Agreement, but Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants had
breached the contract by failing to render payment to
Plaintiffs for funds already received by Defendants under the
terms of the Marketing Agreement. ...
The Proposed Order also does not address Plaintiffs' claim
for breach of contract on the theory that Defendants failed to
allow Plaintiffs access to information in order to allow
Plaintiffs to conduct a meaningful audit under the Marketing
Agreement. ...
The Court's Ruling makes no findings as to why either of
these causes of action should be dismissed and the
Defendants' Proposed Order is likewise silent on these two
causes of action. Nonetheless, both the Ruling and the
Proposed Order dismiss all the causes of action in the
Complaint without specifically addressing these two causes of
action. This is error.
R. 230.

- 15 -

The trial court overruled this objection with a separate ruling. R. 237. Thus, in
spite of having notice of this error before the entry of a final order, the trial court
detennined to proceed anyway and dismissed all the claims of the complaint, including
the claims for failure to make payment under the contract and failure to allow an audit
Q

under the contract. R. 241. In doing so, the trial court committed reversible legal error
and this court should reverse the decision of the trial court.
II.
THE MARKETING AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUISLY REQUIRES
THE PARTIES TO MARKET EACH OTHER'S SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE.

~

The trial court erroneously determined that the Marketing Agreement does not
obligate the parties to market each other's subscription service and improperly dismissed
the complaint.

However, the contract is unambiguous in requiring the parties to market

each other's subscription service, but grants the parties discretion in the manner in which
they conduct their marketing activities.

At most, if the contractual language is

ambiguous and capable of more than one plausible meaning, the relevant extrinsic
evidence as presented in the complaint together with all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom should have been considered by the trial court and the motion to dismiss
should have been denied.
The Marketing Agreement outlines the responsibilities and rights as between the
parties, and references the type of marketing contemplated by reference to an Exhibit 'A'
entitled "Marketing Program." R. 175. The Marketing Agreement also provides that
"[The parties] will use best efforts in the performance of this Agreement." R. 175.
Within the Marketing Program Exhibit A of the contract, there is a table with different
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sections numbered and titled. R. 172. The following relevant provisions are set forth
under the first table section designated "Marketing" within the Marketing Program
Exhibit A:
Each party shall perform the following activities as the
"Marketing Partner" at their sole cost and expense, and under
their own exclusive control. The Marketing Partner can only
market the other company's Complementary Products within
the paid area of the Marketing Partner's website or via email
to previous paying customers.
Promote the other company's Complementary Products as
defined in Exhibit "B" through the web sites it owns and
other applications.
R. 172.
The phrase "shall perform the following activities" followed by "Promote the
other company's Complementary Products ... through the web sites it owns and other
applications" presents an unambiguous contractual obligation on the part of each party to
the contract to market the other's products. R. 172. This, coupled with the overarching
contractual obligation that each party "will use best efforts in the performance of this
Agreement" makes it hard to conceive that using best efforts in promoting the other on
the web sites each party owns can conceivably include not performing any marketing
activity at all.
Surprisingly, the trial court reached the exact opposite conclusion. The trial court
concluded that the phrase "under their exclusive control" gave such broad discretion to
Ancestry in the activities which it "shall perform" that Ancestry could use that discretion
to not perform any marketing activities at all. Thus, the trial court erroneously concluded
that there was no duty to market. In reach.ing this conclusion, the trial court ignored and
- 17 -

did not address the prov1s1on that Ancestry was obligated to "Promote the other
company's Complementary Products . . . through the web sites it owns and other

~

applications" and determined that the provision that each party was obligated to "use best
efforts in the performance of this Agreement" could include doing nothing at all. R. 220.
This was legal error.
A trial court must first attempt to harmonize all of the
contract's provisions and all of its terms when determining
whether the plain language of the contract is ambiguous. It is
axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to
harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which
terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so. Thus, to
harmonize the provisions of a contract we examine the entire
contract and all of its parts in relation to each other and give a
reasonable construction of the contract as a whole to
determine the parties' intent.
Gilmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, 1 19, 121 P.3d 57
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
This principle is black letter law in Utah. See also, Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, 1
16, 62 P.3d 440; LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988);
Brixen & Christopher Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Utah App. 1989).

In this case the trial court ignored the provision stating that Ancestry is obligated
to "Promote the other company's Complimentary Products ... through the web sites it
owns and other applications." There was no discussion on the part of the trial court
regarding how this provision might be harmonized with its conclusion that there was no
duty to market. There was no effort to give this term any legal effect or to even discuss
it. There was no examination of the entire contract and no determination of how this
provision fits in relation to the other provisions of the contract. There was no effort to
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give this provision reasonable construction in the context of the whole of the contract to
determine the parties' intent. In ignoring and not addressing this provision, the trial court
erred.
The trial court also failed to harmonize the "shall perform" provision and the "best
efforts" provision of the contract.

Specifically, rather than harmonizing the "shall

perform" provision, the trial court reasoned that the discretion granted to the parties in
fashioning their marketing activities eviscerated the "shall perform" provision. As the
trial court stated, "This clause turns all exercise of any activities referred to in the
independent clause over to the 'exclusive control' of the exercising party, essentially
negating the phrase 'shall perform.'" R. 221. "[N]egating" a provision of a contract is
not harmonizing it, is not giving that term legal effect, and is not giving reasonable
construction to the whole of the contract. Rather, negating a provision of a contract in
this manner is legal error.
The trial court committed similar error when it also declined to give the "best
efforts" provision any effect. The trial court reasoned that since Ancestry had discretion
in the fashioning of its marketing activities the "best efforts" clause carried no meaning.
In the words of the trial court, "Thus, under the language of the contract, [Ancestry's]
best efforts at marketing could include no efforts." R. 220. This is error. Best efforts
cannot mean no efforts. The parties meant more than 'nothing' when they negotiated for
and included a best efforts clause in the Marketing Agreement. Best efforts is defined as,
"Diligent attempts to carry out an obligation. As a standard, a best-efforts obligation is
stronger than a good-faith obligation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 123 (Abridged 7th
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Ed., 2000). It's hard to conceive how diligent attempts to carry out an obligation can
amount to doing nothing at all. It's hard to conceive how the parties to the contract could
have intended "best efforts" to mean no efforts. The trial court's decision does exactly
what Gilmor and many other Utah cases prohibit. The trial court has eviscerated rather
than harmonized provisions of the contract.

And it had rendered provisions of the

contract meaningless rather than giving effect to all of the contract terms. The trial
court's decision is legal error.
The sole purpose of the Marketing Agreement was to provide for marketing of
each other's products and sharing the revenue generated by those marketing efforts.
Cv·

Rather than harmonizing the provisions to accomplish the purpose of the agreement, the
trial court focused on a small portion of the contract, ignoring the other provisions and
thereby eviscerating the contract's purpose.
The trial court seems to have committed these legal errors due to its conclusion
that under the "exclusive control" provision of the contract, Ancestry gained unfettered
and unreviewable discretion in the way it might choose to fashion its marketing activities,
to the point that it could choose to not market at all under the Marketing Agreement.
(;,

However, as will be discussed at greater length in a separate section below, the granting
of discretion to a party in the manner in which it might perform under a contract comes
with important legal limitations. A party cannot exercise that discretion in a manner that
deprives the other party to the contract from receiving the expected fruits of the contract.
Rather, the party must exercise its discretion in good faith and deal fairly with its
contractual partner. The greater the level of discretion afforded to a contract party, the
- 20 -
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higher and more stringent its duty becomes to exercise that discretion reasonably. See,

Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, 173 P.3d 865; Smith v. Grand Canyon
Expedition Co., 2003 UT 57, 1 19, 84 P.3d 1154; Cook Assocs. v. Utah Sch. & Inst. Trust
Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 284,127,243 P.3d 888.
At the very most, the trial court's analysis regarding why it can disregard the "best
efforts," "Promote the other company's Complementary Products" and "shall perform"
provisions contained in the contract only present the possibility that there exists alternate
plausible readings of the contractual language and that there exists ambiguity in the
language of the contract. Thus, even under the trial court's own reasoning, it should have
conducted an in depth analysis and exploration regarding both facial and latent ambiguity
in the contract, considered the extrinsic evidence as presented in the complaint, and
denied the motion to dismiss.
Ambiguity may present itself in two different ways in contracts, namely "( 1) facial
ambiguity with regard to the language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to
the intent of the contracting parties." Hillcrest Inv. Co., LLC v. UDOT, 2015 UT App
140, 17, 352 P.3d 128. (internal citations and quotations omitted). "A contractual term is
ambiguous if, looking to the language of the contract alone, it is reasonably capable of
being understood in more than one way such that there are tenable positions on both
~

sides." Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3,

1 13,

178 P.3d

886; see also, Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140, 17; Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,
108 (Utah 1991 ). "When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant
evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently
- 21 -

one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own
linguistic education and experience." Ward v. lntermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d
264, 268 (Utah 1995); see also, Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140,

iJ 8.

"Then, after the trial

court has considered evidence of contrary interpretations, the trial court must ensure that
the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the
contract." Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140, iJ 8; see also, Hall v. Hall, 2013 UT App 280,

iJ

12,316P.3d970.

\u..i

Thus, the first step is to consider relevant extrinsic evidence to determine whether
the contract is ambiguous. Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140,

iJ

9. Indeed "Utah no longer

strictly applies the ... plain meaning rule; rather, that rule is just part of the initial inquiry
to determine whether an ambiguity exists in contract language." State v. Davis, 2011 UT
App 74,

if 4 fn. 3, 272 P.3d 745 (internal citations and quotations omitted). As a trial

court conducts this initial analysis, "[ a]lthough the terms of an instrument may seem clear
to a particular reader--including a judge--this does not rule out the possibility that the
parties chose the language of the agreement to express a different meaning. A judge
should therefore consider any credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention."

Ward, 907 P.2d at 268.

A trial court should, "consider the writing in light of the

surrounding circumstances" rather than embracing a strict rule which would "restrict a
determination of whether ambiguity exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of
the terms of the writing itself." Id. (internal citations omitted). The trial court should
conduct "a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the
intention of the parties so that the court can place itself in the same situation in which the
- 22 -
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parties found themselves at the time of contracting." Id. Evidence of a prior course of
dealing between contracting parties is directly relevant and should be considered by a
trial court which is attempting to make a determination regarding whether the contract is
facially ambiguous. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ,r 23, 48 P.3d 918.
It is important to note that this consideration of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the
intent of the parties and determine whether the contract is facially ambiguous is distinct
and separate from the admission of extrinsic evidence after a determination of ambiguity
has been reached in order to resolve the ambiguity and ultimately interpret the meaning
of the contract. The two analyses are discrete, and although there may be overlap in
evidence, the purpose of the consideration of the extrinsic evidence is wholly distinct. In
other words, relevant, extrinsic evidence of "the facts known to the parties at the time
they entered the [contract] is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the
contract is ambiguous."

Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37,

,r

7, 78 P.3d 600.

Thereafter, if ambiguity is found, extrinsic evidence is also admissible to help ultimately
determine the actual meaning of the contract and resolve the ambiguity. Gilmor, 2005
UT App 351, if 37.
In the present matter, the trial court did not conduct any such analysis and failed to
consider the allegations contained in the complaint, which it was required to treat as true
in the motion to dismiss.

Further, the trial court did not conduct any analysis into

extrinsic evidence of the parties' prior course of dealing together with their intentions and
expectations at the time of contracting, which might provide insight into whether the
Marketing Agreement is facially ambiguous on the question of whether there is a duty to
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market.

Instead, the trial court misread the law and seems to have conflated the

admissibility of extrinsic evidence to ascertain an ambiguity with the admissibility of

~

extrinsic evidence to resolve an ambiguity. The trial court states, "The Court may only
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions when a contract is ambiguous." R.
0

222. As shown above, this statement is legally incorrect. The trial court should consider
extrinsic evidence to detennine whether the Marketing Agreement is ambiguous. Thus,
even if the trial court's reading of the meaning of the Marketing Agreement is plausible,

"

the trial court should then have considered the extrinsic evidence concerning the parties'
intentions and prior course of dealing, to determine if that reading might also conform
with the parties' intentions and behavior. To do so would require a determination that
there remain questions of fact regarding intent, and a determination that the complaint
states a valid cause of action for breach of contract under that potential meaning of the
contract. The trial court did not do this, and instead committed reversible error.
Indeed, the trial court has done what the case law specifically warns against-it
has substituted its own linguistic education and experience for that of the actual
intentions of the parties. See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268; Hillcrest, 2015 UT App 140,, 7.
The trial court engages in a grammatical and linguistic analysis of what the "exclusive
control" provision means in the context of the sentence in which it appears. R. 221-22.
The trial court discusses the relationship of this provision to the "shall perfonn" provision
and the "best efforts" provision and concludes that the ''exclusive control" provision
"negates" the other two and rules the day. R. 221-22. The error in this analysis, in
addition to what has already been discussed above, is that it consists of the trial court
- 24 -
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engaging in a "one-sided" analysis based solely on "the judge's own linguistic education
~

and experience'' and without considering the parties own intentions.

Id.

This is

reversible legal error. This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's decision to
dismiss OGF's complaint and remand this case back to the district court.

III. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
REQUIRES THAT ANCESTRY CANNOT EXERCISE ANY DISCRETION IT
HAS UNDER THE MARKETING AGREEMENT TO COMPLETELY
DEPRIVE OGF OF THE BENEFITS OF THE MARKETING AGREEMENT.
OGF properly alleged in its complaint that Ancestry's behavior in relation to the
contract violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the trial court's
decision to dismiss that claim was legal error.
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, parties to a contract agree "not
to intentionally do anything to injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the
contract." Markham, 2007 UT App 379,

iJ

18. A grant of discretion in the performance

of a contract does not remove the covenant of good faith and fair dealing from the
contract, but instead amplifies the duty. See Smith, 2003 UT 57,

iI 19 ("[W]here one

party has discretion over another according to the terms of the contract, that party must
~

act with good faith and fair dealing."); Cook Assocs., 2010 UT App 284,

iJ 27.

Indeed,

"[t]he degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of the covenant
turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have defined their expectations and
imposed limitations on the exercise of discretion through express contract terms."
Markham, 2007 UT App 379,

iJ 21 (quoting Smith, 2003 UT 57, iJ 20). When "express
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contract terms" do not limit a party's exercise of discretion, the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is paramount. Id.
Courts imply a "reasonableness" limitation to the exercise of contractually
permitted discretion.

In Markham, the court supplied an "objective standard of

reasonableness" to a seller's discretion to cancel a real estate purchase contract if it
disapproved of the buyer's financial information. Markham, 2007 UT App 379,

,r 22.

The court noted that without an objective reasonableness standard governing the seller's
discretion, the seller's promise to sell the property would be "illusory." Id. at

,r

G

23.

Similarly, in Cook Assoc., a clause in a lease agreement gave the landlord "sole
discretion" to raise rents every five years as the landlord deemed "reasonably necessary."
Cook Assoc., 2010 UT App 284,

,r,r 18, 27.

The court held that because of the explicit

grant of discretion to the landlord, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing served "to
protect the other party from an inappropriate exercise of that discretion." Id. at

,r 27.

Because the contract imposed no "agreed formula" or "'express standard," the landlord
was required to exercise its discretion "reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties" in accordance with their "purpose, intentions, and expectations" when it raised
rent. Id. at ,r,r 28-29. Finally, Utah law is clear that,
An examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient
to determine whether there has been a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. To comply with his
obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose
and the justified expectations of the other party. The purpose,
intentions, and expectations of the parties should be
determined by considering the contract language and the
course of dealings between and conduct of the parties.
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C)

St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,
200 (Utah 1991 )(internal citations omitted, emphasis in
original).
In the instant case, OGF presented a complaint that alleged that Ancestry had
improperly reinterpreted the Marketing Agreement in an unreasonable way. R. 6-7. The
trial court was required to accept those allegations as true for the purposes of the motion
to dismiss.

Id. at 196.

Specifically, that Ancestry unreasonably decided that the

Marketing Agreement did not contain an obligation to market and had therefore ceased
its marketing activities. Ancestry argued to the trial court that the discretion granted to it
under the marketing agreement was so broad that it was not required to market at all. R.
102-125.

In support of this theory, Ancestry relied on a portion of the Marketing

agreement which provides as follows:
Each party shall perform the following activities as the
"Marketing Partner" at their sole cost and expense, and under
their own exclusive control.
R. 172.
The trial court accepted this argument, reasoning that,
Generally, "shall perform" is indeed obligatory language that
imposes a duty upon a party, and would do so in this case
were the sentence to end there. However, in this case, this
sentence includes the dependent clause "at their sole cost and
expense, and under their own exclusive control." This
dependent clause is a restrictive modifying clause, changing
the entire meaning of the independent clause. This clause
turns all exercise of any activities referred to in the
independent clause over to the "exclusive control" of the
exerc1smg party, essentially negating the phrase "shall
perform." Because each party maintains exclusive control
over any activities perfonned under the Marketing
Agreement, each party retains the right to perform any
amount of marketing that the party chooses, including no
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marketing at all. Because Defendants have no affirmative
duty to perform any marketing activity under the Marketing
Agreement at all, they cannot be in breach of contract for
performing no marketing activity.
R. 221.
As already discussed above, this ruling and rationale by the trial court is erron~ous
for a number of reasons. 2 As it relates to the claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, the trial court expressly states that Ancestry is permitted to
interpret the contract in a manner which allows Ancestry to strip from OGF the
anticipated fruits of the contract. This result is exactly what the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is designed to prevent.
As set forth above, if Ancestry had discretion in the manner in which it could
market under the Marketing Agreement, as the trial court found, then Ancestry has a duty
to exercise that discretion reasonably.

Moreover, without express definitions or

limitations on how the discretion should be exercised, Ancestry's duty to exercise that
discretion reasonably is even more amplified. Smith, 2003 UT 57,
UT App 379,

,r 21.

,r 20; Markham, 2007

The trial court's decision that the Marketing Agreement contains no

duty to market accomplishes the very result that this Court specifically warned against in
Markham. The promised fruits of the contract become "illusory." 2007 UT App 379,

,r

22. Similar to Cook Assoc., the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should
Those reasons include the failure to consider extrinsic evidence like the parties' prior
course of dealing and the intent of the individuals who originally drafted and entered into
the Marketing Agreement to determine if there is latent ambiguity, as well as an express
willingness on the part of the trial court to disregard or eviscerate clear contract terms,
rather than harmonize and give effect to all terms, like finding that the phrase "shall
perform" has been "'negated."
2
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serve "to protect the other party from an inappropriate exercise of that discretion." 2010
UT App 284,

,r 27.

The trial court's failure to acknowledge that the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing protects OGF, and the trial court's outright endorsement of
Ancestry's abuse of the discretion granted to it in the contract, was legal error.
OGF properly articulated a cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by asserting that Ancestry had improperly reinterpreted the contract in an
unreasonable manner which directly deprived OGF of the fruits of the contract and which
deviated from the purpose, intentions, and expectations and was directly contrary to the
parties' prior course of dealing. R. 6-7; see St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 200. The cause of
action was well pied and, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the trial court was
required to accept those facts as true. Id. at 196. The trial court committed error, when,
in the face of these well pied allegations, it found that the benefits OGF expected to
receive under the contract were illusory and that Ancestry had no duty to perform any
marketing at all. The trial court should have permitted OGF to proceed with its claim of
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it properly alleged that
Ancestry had breached its duty to exercise its discretion in a manner that was "reasonably
within the contemplation of the parties" and in accordance with their "purpose,
intentions, and expectations." Cook Assoc. 2010 UT App 284 at

,r,r 28-29.

Indeed, the

trial court declined to even allow OGF the opportunity to develop evidence on what the
"purpose, intentions, and expectations" of the parties even were. This was legal error and
requires reversal.

OGF presented a properly pied claim and should be provided an

- 29 -

opportunity to prove that claim through appropriate legal process. This Court should
reverse the decision of the trial court.

IV. THE CONTRACT HAS AN EXPRESS PUNITIVE DAMAGES
PROVISION AND OGF PRESENTED A PROPER CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
The trial court dismissed OGF's cause of action for punitive damages because it
found that "because there is no breach of contract. " 3 However, if OGF did properly plead
valid causes of action in its complaint, then its claim for punitive damages also survives.
The Marketing Agreement contains the following punitive damages provision,
In no event will a Party be liable to the other for indirect,
incidental, consequential, punitive, special or exemplary
damages . . . unless such breach is as a result of gross
negligence or willful misconduct.
R. 99.
The complaint states,
The combined actions of Ancestry to breach and thwart
performance under the Marketing Agreement and prevent
OGF from receiving the fruits of the contract constitute
willful and malicious conduct because the intentionally
breached the clear and understood language of the contract.
Such actions were taken intentionally, knowingly, and with
conscious disregard for OGF's rights.

R. 3.
These allegations properly state a cause of action for punitive damages under the
terms of the Marketing Agreement and the trial court recognized such, but dismissed

3

It is also worth noting that on a motion to dismiss, the trial court should not decide

whether a breach of contract occurred, but rather whether or not the complaint states a
valid cause of action for breach of contract under the facts alleged.
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them on the basis of its conclusion to dismiss all other causes of action in the complaint.
-.iJ

R. 219. If this Court reverses the decision of the trial court to dismiss OGF' s breach of
contract claims and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it must
also reverse the decision of the trial court to dismiss its properly pied cause of action for
contractually allowed punitive damages.
CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should hold that the trial court
committed reversible legal error when it failed to address or consider OGF's causes of
vJ

action for breach of contract for failure to make payment and for failure to allow an audit
under the contract.

This Court should further hold that the Marketing Agreement

unambiguously contains a duty to market and the trial court's decision to the contrary
was likewise in error. Also, this Court should determine that OGF presented a properly
pied claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in alleging
,,,,...

that Ancestry acted unreasonably when it <Jecided to engage in no marketing efforts at all
under the Marketing Agreement and reverse the decision of the trial court. Finally,_ this
Court should reverse the trial court's decision dismissing OGF's claim for contractually
permitted punitive damages.
DATED and SIGNED this £ ¾ " o f September, 2015.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
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Addendum A

-MARKETING AGREEMENT.

THIS: AGREEMENT IS in~4~ as 'Q{ Aprit2Q, 700~· ~y and benveen .Z~Coip,. a u·tah·eozpo~fon,dba
OneGreatFamiiy.com-(he~~~~..r~furr~ as~ uo_GF''}with its·prla:tjpal piaC.e ofbusinesslocaied ~ 143 We~t 1200
·Norµt #l OQ; Springyilie, U~ ~46~3 and People Seafuh. Ivfe4fa, LLC., a:~~vada. J,i~ited Lmbil_i~-C~rpo~ti<>n ,vith.
its rlrincip~ pl~ce· ofbusiriess located at l 01 Uni-vetsity Ave.~- Sui~ #320, :PalQ ;Alto, CA 94301 (heremafter
referred :to. as "P.SM').
·

WHEREAS, P.SM snd OG.F a.rt
s~i~ to cQusum.ers.

mthe pusiness of oni1ne ·marketing and ·seliing• ·vaxfotlS praduc..ts and
··

·

~~$~:tltc::patties d~re.for-PS)fto )lse:.the·OQf Q.am:e ~d ~~ tQ-.allow PSM CU$totn~~ tQ
purclmse: actesS lo OOF;s prodl.lcts @d ~ef;(fi~ .aJ}d =~~9 fo( OGF to· use. the. P.SM nam.e-and. tt~~nr~ ·to ~9w
OFO customers to _pur~,: PSM produq~: and ·s~.rvices. as· pfuvioetf h~reut:and :fur.tlier- d~cribeq. mExhibit A
a~hed.herefo ana·.m~e-~a.rt ·o~ tlns--Agreement:(tbe '1Marketmi:l>rt'.>gi8Jll")r

·· ·Now, TBE~FOT{E, fat.and: w~nsid~ratj'on of:1he promises -and eov.eilant$· ~tained. Ji¢rein an4 onier

go9'1 and vaiuable ·~~i~e~on,. Uie -rect:i.P4 SU:fficlency ·and. ad~·-of ·wlti~ are berel;>y acbo.!'}~gc~ the
paqies he"retQ «P.~ ~ "foJi()ws:

fl.. Mar~~~_g.Pro~: OOF and P.SM: ~if~:t9 irppJ~ent:~ of the-elements Qf the Mar~eting l'fogi:am ~
d~-~~ i;n Jgliibii:Aa~\.l~d ¥.~to,and.made~part:of-dll$ Agteetneµt.. ·p.at,t1es w.iU ~t~lya~ on
~ SUQ$erlpti~# 0.f!~ wiU be··ptbn\o~ and the pdte -~f
~ -C?~C9 to.· Ow end -~JI. -suoh.
agree~~n~ once. htade in writing, wili ~c;--v-tilld ·w.til ~e pq who~s-offering {-s being W-QtIXQt~4 g{v~a.
notice to the promoting: patty of. tbcir ·dcs,ir~'to ~9·longer
thirt oft'~g or- ptice. U_P:on =receipt of
such notice, tbe Ptom.QP:J.li-Jll\to/ wiij.!iav.e:S0·day;s to. stop.promodnJ that off.er; ·

•rf

wm·

!2. Good and Worfonanfike Manner~ Q.OP. m):4. P&lVJ. wjQ. QSe .best· effot:tS In· the- performaJipe of this
A:gteement, 1ind 1».th ~II ..be .r~~bn¢l?le fQr ~o:viding .setVices b).' ~e4 p~_e;>mtel" in a~rdance
wlth the. specltications ~d r._equ.iremen.ts· of eacli Patty. on a tituely basis ·it:1 a: ptqf~ssio~al, good and
wor~an6k;e manner,. and wilf .oonfonn. t6 the stan~ru;d$ ~f,~e, s1dll, dilige~ce•.performance· and. safety.
.customarily ex<.1rcised ox·.oom~teQ.t prof~si~l}als p~tf'orm~g services siinilarto thos~ CQii~il)p,}aie-4 by

this·Agteem~nJ.

·

·

3. lndemnffication! Each Partjt-· (the "'lnd~illllify.i:ng· Party'') a'grecs to "indemnify and hofd ha1ml~· th~
other Party~ :its e.f.tfoefs, ·d1rce.tors, share.bold~~t eiJ]ployees. or a~enls: (the. '~Indemnified Par.lid') fro~
any and 'air Hjmilitles,. lo.ss~, daroa_ge~, .clai~~ suits~. jud~~n.ts-, c-osts- $.nd expense~ (lpcluding
T~:;isonabl~ au9m~yf .f~ .and costs··ot' arty inve.stigatien or~on ·relat~- ~~re.to.) suffered ~r incurred
by the; lnpemnified Parties ~dmifg from.. a. third PMtY- claim {i) as a- result of·the Indemnifying PJlify~s
_perfmlnance under· or. breaqh of· this :Agree~el,\~ or {ii) fr.om the ·breach or meotteetness of any.
representation _or ~cy- mad~~ h~r.ein- bt the IIi~e~cy.itig Pmty.:- Tue jnd_~zwrl~ed f~y -shall_ ~ve.
notice to t.h~· :I~4.~mnifying ~Y promptly al.wt. th~ -~~~fi~. :puny ha, actual knowle.d'ge of {itly
claim as ta ,vbich ·Indemnity mliY. b¢ ~p~ght,. 1nd :.s~l permit the .Indemnifyi~_g- P~y Co. assume· uie.
-~ef~nse: .of 1$y $\\Ch clahn. ~i.- AAY.. litlg~ti~p. -resultin~:there.ftoin• T.l:re fu,deirinjfyµ}g:P~ s~r .µ~t 'have
the dght .tQ· ·_$e:gle- ct:?.~PrQ~~ or··otherwisc ·enter mtQ. any :agreen1e,1t :r;e~~: the disposition of any
cl~ against the Indemnified P~y with91J:~ pri~l; ~~!?- co~s~nt and appio:Ytil. oftbe..thde,;nrti:fi~ party,
which sbaU not be·urtr~on~bly .withhel.d,.
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4. Limitat1on ot LiabHify:. In. po event will a iurty· b.e: iiabfo to ·the Q(her (or. inqirecf, 1-Qyidenia~
t:onseq~entiaI, p~mitive;_ sj:,ecfal ·ot exemplP:ty ~.nma2~s (e:ven· ·if that ~arty has been advised of the
possibility o( such drune;ge·s)~:·fil1Sing from perfqnn~ce lµ,1der. or firilurc of' perfonnance of.any provision
of this Agt,eem~~t-:(u.it::lqdi.ng_:sl}ch :~~~ inct!fr~· 1>y tnird parties)~ such as~ .but nqt li.n1it¢.d to, loss .of

rev~h\le or anticipatqi:\ prQ_fit~ or lost biisirtess, wiles-$ such bre~ch iS'--as a re;sult. of·gi:os~ ;neglig~nc;o or
willful ~ise<;>µduct.

·

5. -.Confidentiality! From U111e tp. time a :Parfy: wi)l di:sclose· (the "f?iscloser~1) 00.nfide.ntial and ·proprietary.
infomwtioti :tllat is lIUlik~~ ~ ~onfidential .or propdetar.t .or·.by the n~tute: Qf Jil~ 1;ir~u.msta,it~-of·tp~
disclosµre Qt conte.i:it- q( the ·infoi111atl611 should ~l1S6i1ably be: k.nOWll to :b~ c.qnfiden!i~l ("Confidential
lnfonnati~n'~) to th! .other=.Party· :(the ·4Recipient''): :in ea~~- su~\\ case, -~e Recipient sluill hold. such

Confidential Infonn·auon in ·strictest •contid.erice WJ~ shall protect.:Such 1nformation .by-all reasr.mabie. and
hec~s.saty· s~tµriiy. m~ur~~.,. 'JAe· Confioential Inforimition shall .not .be. disclos·ed except t() .a Party~·$
empl9yee~. who ~~ subject .to siinilat ~onfide.nti-pl 6bligatipns ~ whp· h.aye a :n~- to know· -suefi
Confidential •Jnfbtmatlotf·1n otder· to ~rfoqn su.ch: P~rrty'=s obi{gatj'ons .under tliis: Agreement.. Neither
Party·siuul have a.ny n,ghtsi in t'1~ .01:he~ P.a.rtY's C~nfidefitial lnfor-mation.:antl· shaii te.tUm ~r ~~~Y all
such C.Onfi&~tial Jt,formatj.@ .qpon :ffie. termination of this, Agreement or: request of th.e. Di~lf;>s~g
f ar:tY~ Cfeon.fldeniiaL Infotmation~t $h.a1l' not ino!pd¢ iruotm~t!Pn that~ (~) !'/RS: ,~ready in the lawfLil
possesslon. of 'the Re~!~i~nt ptic>..t JP: .~ipt ther~Qf,- ~~lf" or i~directly, from 1he Disclose.r, (~1
!awfully. become$ ay-aila'bl~·tc:, ·R-ecipieQtoo a- nqn~confidetitial basis from t sour¢e; 9thet ~31' Qf$.1~.~er
that ·l)oi tU1der an oblig~jfou tq keep: such ·irifonnation-confide.nnal; (c) i's.- ge\l..~ly av¢.l~ble to the
pµblre Qther·tban.~ a=r~lf of.a·bteach. ofithis,.Agreer.nent.by.lte~lpient or i~ r~prese~tativ°'~):=or:(d) is
-subsequent1y·m ino~den:tly d~v~{oJ?~.P).''.employ~es.t. co~~~ts-~r agents ofthe .Recipient ~thou"t
r.eferenee·to·the C~nnd~tial bjfonru~iAA 4lsp1ose4 mider this ~eeoient.. t.:7otwf-thst~ru.Un~.anytliln~ to
the .contrary in this ~gr~ent,_ notlihlg sh~I :prevent ·or prohibit ):t~lpient- ft9Il\ p{(?1li4~ ap~ss t~
C~1dide~t=iiµ 'Infbrmal'io!-l as--~j be -~uired. oy· l~w- pmvid~ th.at Re~ipi~n( ~~ as·mtio1i notice: as':is.
reasonably. practical 11nd pmvide.s r~onlible ass~e to the Discloser in. cltailenging ~r maclify.iag th~.
djsofo~t.iie so. r~tdred PY f~w. "ijle f.a,tties acknowledge that. Confidential loform~flon ts uniqu~ and
~uapl~.J a.nd ~tdisc;io.simrin breach·.of tiifr~gr¢(ment will tesl\lt in irr;ep~able ·i~j-gry to I)iJcfo.s~ fat
whie.h-mon~~ ~ges ~one-wcMa nQt: ~ ~ ~equate r,:q1e(ly.. Therefore\ the Parties agr~ tfiat in ·
the e-veilt of «: breach. or ~ijmaj- J;>~h ~l n1:1nfid~ntiality~ the Diiolosor_ :shall be;: entitle4 t~ se-e~
injunctive or: other ~ui~ble re.I(~f ~s 8: remedy far any such. breach o:r a:ntitipat~d breach without ,the.
n~ces~ity of p~sti.ng a 1;,ond
·

is

:6. Au~it. Rights: D\\d~~ the. P:,;og{-'nt Tenn~ upol)· ;Went_y (10). .b_uslness days; ~prlo.r: ·writteJi. notice, rS.M.
shall- hav~ the; rigl.u· to=send an:eniployee .or ot11er patty, :to OGF"s offices .tp•inspeet. OG'F1s t~ro.i:ds lo the
ext~~t ~~onably-~~~satY arid IOL~Wfbr tlie· ~se veflfyiiJg· b.OF'st@rils·.re~4ing customer sign~
upsj ~~latio~
·other infti"tn1aifon·mattrial to·tµe te~ ·of paym~nt under the..Matketmg Pto~
Such inspection: ~1i ..not .Q~cur· r,tQX<:i ~ o.ij~~· pe.~ ~~eµ~ar ·)'eat durini ·the .Pr-ogram. T.eJD1. AU s~cilt

of

and

J"OO$l'°ds shall b~ -~t~a.:~ Q9.iµide~~ ~omiaiion and sucli:-insp~~ti.ons shaU ~£conducted J,y :PS~ .~m.g
OGF'n1Qm1a:I. -busin~,s hotl.ffl antl,in-a:reasonabl~ mann~ witmiµt tmdue bvrden: on the c0nduct of OOF•s
business. ·such audit wili be at ~e'.~~~e ·p.f P.S.M,. ~~~:any audit.-siiows .-an uilderpayin'etiUo P$M ·

fot"the.atidit penoo of.fiv.~ per~nt {5%) ont\Ore-,.~in which .case-<5GF sluill.~Y the: reASQnable exp.~nses

. C,

Ci( suc}J ·amJit.: Likewis.:~ _g~ the PiQ_gr,am·"T.~nn,. upqn t,~enty ~Q) h~4~~s. d~ys~ -p~·ior written: notice~
'OQI: s)lall hav.e the..tfght t6·se11d ari.employee;:01 other party" to PSM~s·o.ffi~es,to inspoot"PSM't:tecords:to

·the extent reasonably nfJe¢..~ty ·and ;$blelf for the purpQse o.f verifying PSM's _recoras··reg~ng Cl]Sq:)tner
$lgn•ups, ~Jtcel~~tia:os, and atber µifonnation mater-ial" to the. terms af pa.YJ.llent und~= tne· Marke~ng
P:ro~ Such ;inspection shall not occur ttior~ than-on¢e p~r calei:idar year· dµrin_g the ·Program :feim.
All. sueh. recortls sbalf be ·tteatecf ns,.Q;~d~al' ~~c;mnJ1f.ipn ~q .such -inspediom ·sfodJ b.e co11.tlq~t'ciJ by
OGF; during P.$1r.s normal busines~ ·ho.~ .~d· lh a re~ona'hie ~a:iihet• without. undue bwd~n .Qn ~e.
conduct of P.sM's busineS$. -S~ch audit -wi11.be, -at the ~P'ense· of 0-0~, tuiles~ .~Y awiit shows· an:

2
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underpayment to QGF for tl)e. ~ucµ\ _period-qf fiye p~,cent (5%) or. more~ in which. case PSM ·shall. ~aythe teaso_na,ble ~:xpenses. of suc];l. audit.

~

7. Notices: Notices ·provided fot- in this Agre~ment will .be in ·writing ·an4 will be ,delivered by· hand,
facsim.ile,:OVeynlght"m:ajl or ~tUfi¢d·mailr e~~n~ or r~gnizeq.-ovemight delivery s¢rv1ce-to the Parti~
:
at the·acl4resse_s_mentfoned -~~ov~_.or su~h-9ther-addresses either PartY may

p.rovide. .to."the other faey·in

wri~g~

~

8. Relationship;·_ Neither this. Agr.etm;l~t, nQr ~itQer..Pai:ty's particlpadon iri the ~ubjcct matter- of· the
A~me1_1t:i~ :intei:ide4 to" c~~~- w;ty :ag~~Y, .franc~se,'.~mles repres~ntative, joint ventu,t~, ·p&t.nershl._p~ or
:enJplQ.Ym-ent rel~ti"t;>nship .between. the· Parties -ana ·neithe.r. .Party has any lµ.ltl;t.¢tity t9 bi~d 1he other
without.prit>r \vritte.n cansent

9. ienn; This Agre~t '?(>mm~.nees on ·fhe :Effeetive Date and .shail :eQntinn:e. in -~ect fur 011e y~
"Initial Te~" anq .shall autoiilati.cally. ·renew ther~after. .for" addi_tiou.31 .on~ -ye~ tenns any -of which
.constitutes-a "Term" unl~ss-eithet pa(tY: ·pr.ovides· th~·Q.tner party with wri~ri.-notice: of non~renewal at
]east (60) <layi prior ta ·the en4 qfa Tetm~ .Jf -~iU!~r. party shQuld beJn·mater.ial. breach of this. /1,greein_ept,
and such breavlt· i~ nGt"recµfi~d, witb.jn :I d~y.s of noufi<:atioti By the Jj•n-breaching pan..y. then the non~
brea~g_pa~y .shal:1 have the,right-to terminate this J\:gteemeti.t dil 6-0 days no-ticete the.party in b~ach.
To-the fullest exfent.ap_plicablet Sec.tfons·t, 3, 4~.S, 6, .~and.~ll J."CV.enue=s~~-i eon:upissi9n. and billing
&. in.voice ob~galions of any ~oil at.4lohep. li~reto· ~n ¢.eir entirety .shall sumv.e termiiiatioti of this

.A~ment=

·

itO.SeverabilitI:
;

tf :atlY .pto:vision. of ibis Agr~ment. ~ invalia ·er uo.¢0l'Ce~bl~t. the Agre~illent will b~
construed'. as if su~h. il).Valid ()l' ,m~furceable provision was not included. and the- i'e,namder of the•
Agreemem. shall be en(o.reed.~ wri.tte.n.· ·

;11.W~iver: A Party's. f'ailwe tQ .en.f~ aqy .pto¥i~on "Of th~ /.l~~en;t wUi not. be. a waiver of its tiglit to
subsequmt.enf~~~tnt qf-the__proviJion. or any o~er-provision,ofth~ Agre~men(.
·

l

12.. Assigllft!ent; :N~ftltet· PaJ1Y :atay assign thjs Ag_~ment ~~out: the Qther J!arty 's prio1: written consent,
except .as follo\\.'S: "© to an .~ffilia~~ provid¢-· tl;le assigning Party remains responsible -tbr all of its
obligations. uoa~ t:W~- ~grccm~; and (ii) to an;a~q1urer of a11· or ~u"bstanti~y all o! .tli¢ :~ets., or :e¢.ty
of th~ ~arty,_ proYided .the 1iCQUinniri>any ~sum.es =:t~P.Q.nSibiltty f.o.r ~fl -of' ~e- ~b!igati9~ of tluifPartyuniierlbis A.gte~ent.
··
·
·.

i

:IN WITNESS w:n;E~OF, lJre. parti~s- .fiereto havij caused tnis- Agreen1e1:1t to be effec;tiv.~ upon the
-~x~on hereof.
·
··
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:EXIDBIT '~A?'·
MARKETING"
P.R0Git4.M'.
..
. ..
•.

'•,o •

i • :•• •• M;

•:

o

•.

, • _.,: _ . ) _ , . : . ~ • •

l : Marketing
:

!{
?~::,, •'"~•~•'.•••~,-~1,:.:;,J,.,~ . ~ ...~ ..~i,.:n.~.:1::r:. ,.:. :~•
0!<:.:;y _ ;} :1 ••.:.;,,• ;,~.,, ..,::,,e~~r!!;:,;:~:.:~.;~~:~:;f..1::[:<.1tf.~
Each party shal1 perfo~in the folfowing activities :as the ''Maiketing.Partner1' at tl.i~ir
sole eos~· and-.ex:penset: and:tinder'their own e"clusive COP°ttbi- The- fyfar~ting .Pa$}~r:

'.,:,

can only market:the·.otlfer" cbfilpany'~ Compl~entacy Products within flie .paid afoa of
·thelvtatketilig P~~t's -v.:r~b.sJt~ pr·via ~ to previous.p(iymg customers. Offermg
bundles th:at i.MlU_d~ :M?rketing: Partner1sand Complementary=.Pto.ducts to noncustoµie~ is· ~hictly pr~fiibited. unie.ss::appm.v~ of:in writing by~ ltec~iying f Pl'O;l'.er.
Promr>te the. other oompants CoI11plemen.~ Pro4uets :as ¢cµned in :Exhioit i,B:;,.
thfoµgh ·the; web ~ijes. it.~"!05-~4 ·other applications.
• C~1)tur~ ~µ-~ourer ·co~t~~fJ: eiµ.:<>_Um~t an~ payment infonrtatit>n for custQJilers- who
~sh to: p~~e the Complementary Pr<1ducts,. and "ttansf~t.suiiici~nt.. lt:tfo,tnWQon
lb create~an·,aceount.(Minnnwn.r.equir.ein.etlts! ~it:w.Last ijame-~~ ;email cW~re~s:;
pto;V;iding. P.ost$i ·C,p@and-11: (laythne:pno~~ numb~r :will be tested for retetitfon
pu.rposes).-fu. a:~ec~e pi~n~ 19 ~he .other .company Via a mutually. agreed upon
in~rf~~-no later than 24 hours after a dustomei' places th~:Qrder..

2

Ord~t

Fulfillmeqt

3!

·!

&µ-ly
Te.nnjn~lion

·• Bilhhe. ~sto~er qpo~- p~h~e. 'f:hi$ will happen iromedi~if ~pqn-:an upfrQnt
sale or .aftet th~ apPra_p.rla~ elapsed petioQ. JfscHd on a free..trlaJ· bas.is.
• -Prpv.i~ ot11er cohiP.«OY with an on.line m~thod .for thefr ~~prt teprcaen~~v.~s:-tecance1 fu.tn.re billin&$,·~~11<1.~ futnre billing·date> ot re!Q~a a past hilling.
o lnforin oth~r comp~y if1he ousit)met ~-aocaunt ~~- cJe39tfy~ for--any reason-other
:than the acc~unt b$l ~e'U~d b "-.su .. ot.t r .resentathie..9f.tli~:0t~t t~nt .rui ..
:each·party ~ce{ring QU_.o~ c,r.for·-a1'2Qmplmn.eritaty. rodliet '~Rtc:eivfrig P.atttner ·trom
the otb~r c9qiga,ny :''M~keting•Partnef' slmll-perf~nn the following aqfivit.ies i\~-~
·Receivin$ P4i1ner'-s, ~olei cost,ancl ~~pell$¢, ~d =~der th:~ llee.eiyipg f~~er,s exclusive
. co.nfiol:.
-.. Fulfill orders· f<>r custom~ passe4-ta Re.~i~~ng-Pa$~-by Marketlng.P:artner at
ser.v.iee.1¢ycls C!.onsi$te~t- with.tho$e pro'\ride.d by Receiving Parmer generally.
• Provid~·timely e~Q~er supw.rt ~ervice whose represtn.tatives ·acth-ely eance.l
- ~ billi1;1gs, ~~tend-a future billing date, 9r·r.e.fuiia' p~ mlllngs. ~ncq¢."e4 it? .
~tisfy-custamers·-U.siriB tae'intei.faoe provided by Mattreiing Partner for ,ueh
purposes.. incoming ~alls-'will be pick~d l!JJ. ,t Ie~st 70% of th~ time. clurins
bilSmess. he.urs ~-all_ phon~ ~ls-mid emails will- be personally r.esponded.lo
wi.~-48 lJ.p;urs w.ith.!.tlie aV: e monthl ·r.e.s ·on$e tbne.bei · ·l~s flum. 24 hours.
• ln:.additi~ t9 :the ~~ntli~~n:r(gl}.ts cove.r.ed fu: Secuon .9 Dtthi~ z,grte,n):lllt, ·any·
time prior. fG 9.0 days.:after·the first -~fer of ~rollmel)t anq ·p;iyroent infonnatio~
nescribed in Exhibit "A'\ se~iion 1, either·pa:rty (?an_proyide- ~tten notia.e to theother:of their. 4'e:;ire tQ ~inafu th~.:program. · If sticli: ·even~t·tlie.PrQgian;i will
te-m~_inate 60 ~~$ after receiptofsai:cf wrltte11:-notl~e..

Product
. • _The·pr~uct;C.Qnfigiiratjbr,1 ~Q.d,priciqg w:ill be detennirtoo:ml)tually ml~ :may: QnlY."
' · Coniigµratio.n :
.be f;lpa;Qged· by a mutual agreement- ofboth·parties,. wid rnUS:t be do~qme.1:1ted .fa

.2li·

:vmtin°.

'

. \J11
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5: Customer
Data
6. Revenue,

Share1md

Commissions.

• ~h- ~9.mpany .shali own ai\Y data that if coilecf$ .with r~gar~ktQ customers a$ Well
as :an:r, data "that [s:•:seht to jt °t:>y the c:5ther:cQ.t;rtp_any ~·:a p~ ofthi~- Marketing
Pro·· .

G

Revenue-share and commission$ $ball be as-defined in "Exhil1i(J3..and~can Ot¥Y:be
changed tbr,Qugh muhJal a~e~~ent of-bo(~· parties,, and niust-be do:~to.iiertted with
an aodep-<\:u.ni 'thiir~eciment. ~everitie share payments:shail apply only to
billings-f~rmembetshij,-s-sold via the· Marketi_ng .PaM~r a,nd not foi;: any future·
.. mduots:·or.
sen
.
.
. foe.s .that.miJ:.. . be. pffered 10·
. the Customer
.
. . li
. . th~_R-eeeivin .Partner~
.

to

1

t

.

Bill~ng/

invofoin
8! Termination

'- In the event.oftertnlnatio~ of tlfe Markefi:ng.P.rQ~ by either patty, Marketing·
P~net sh.ajl pay Re~iving Partner for all commissions eiuued ft.om tlie progi'atJl:
priqr to the Temrlimtfon dllle, and. will also ·pay .I{eoei~g ·P~~J;:fQr alt· ·
.~o~ssioris on.sales .dile,to refetra~ w.1ii~h oc~~ prior to T¢11ll-in~1ion l?ut !Qrwhieb sales, were:.,:~cotded aft¢r t~rmination..
.
.
.

5
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Commissions
Commission_·Perc~~g~: PSM wilt pay OGF a Revenue: Share popsi:stjn~ qf.40%0.ft~e Qrqss R~t(enues (it~t -c;,f
rctubts and chargobacks) ·collected fro.m any-cust0.m:ct who is· r.oferreiHQ O'.GF :fro~ PSM and is subsequently· .
bitled by ·PsM. Thi$ Rev~1'µe. Share· will apply to ·a11:payrnents·made: by such.-eustom.ers::fofcurr:ertt 1nembers'hip
~ubscriptiol)S:nat for ~ny fuh:tre n~.product-offenilg or services.

Payinent Terms·: By the 5th of each month,. PSM·wm pr4Y.ide OGF \\?th ~.list of.al1.PSM·referred c'ustotners
whd- were su~ssfuily- biUecJ cl~g the P~9f moµt).'l as: w~Jl as any refunds= or- cfiarg~backs associa.te.d. with.any
P.SM custo~s dtµfag th~ san:ie -\Aon;th,. along with the Gross Revenue associ$te-d' "\iith eiiPb trans~e.tiun. l3y the
30th ·of'eaeh mon~. ~SM will provide OGF payment via .cfii'ect batik depbsit o.f the Revenue-Shar.ei

te.tininatlon:· In the event tbat.this.-ccm~act is tenrililf)ted; :PSM will-continue to pay theappro,priate-ReY.encte
Slfdt'-e· to OOF fot C~lOll'ler.s. r~~~g~~ t(_) OQF ·duriD:g :the tinle. period'. ili.~t the contr-ac.t was in force. Hnwever,.
follpwing .12.months:after:tennin:rtion-.of'tllis agreefuen.t, if for any 3 mor,.th perio4. :th~_~y~,:ag~. tQ~ Reve~ue
S~.owed ·to OOF per month..is less than:·$·250, ·the.l\ foUo-w.ing the-en~ of that 3 month period.P-SM may-cease.

anyltfuture Rtvl:nue·share paymeµts
to Owf\
.

Commission Percentage: OGF will'pay- PSM al~.eyenue,Sh~~ consisting.of40% of the Gross R~v~n,u~ (~et of
returns an:d char.gebaeks)' Qollected-t.rom aqy customer .who is referred.to· i>sM front ()GF and js ~ub~~qu~tly
bill~ by OGF.. 11$. R~v~nue Sbare will apply:to. ail payments m~de by sueh oustmn~ for·~~t:me~b.ermip
sub~criptions nof for :any .future.new pr.od\tct off'eriQi Qt ~ervic~s
·

~r~-

P~ntent Ter.ms: :By~- S~ of~ mpnlh, QGF :wiil provid.e P.-SM·with ~ Hst of all bOF
custp~e.~s·
~h~ were· successftµly. billed :diliing the-prior month llS;~l.l PS fµl_y ·refunds orcha:rgeb~ associated with any
OG;F.·Gtistomer-s· dunng the -~e month,. alcmg with· the.· Gross -~~v~nue associ~~ with each. trittlsa.c.1ion. By tne•
301ti of.~f1.ch month, OGF will pt~~i4e P.S~·pa~e~t ~~ direct barik d~posit ,of the -Reyenue Share~
Te.rlninntiom Jn: the. event-that.this eon~et-)~ te.r.nrlnatech OOF' wi'{l et:mtj~e :to· pay th~ appropri'o.te R-evenue·
Shdre to :PSM for tustometS refetr:ed to.·.PSM during• th~ time period that the c.oritraof was in force~ Howev.er,
to-ilowing 12 months der tetmiJla~on ~f *is· ~gr~~mentt if for-any-3 inonth period the avera:g~ total R.~em.i~

Shfe owe4 r.o P.SM p~i: m:ontlt::is Jess.~ _$2.50, then foilowing:the. end-of that _j_Jn()p~.b:pe(iod OGF may Q~e

~Y: fQturo .R~venue S~c:payme11~ to.-PSM.
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Addendum B

Vi)-

. ffil.s·Consent t<> A$$lgnm~f C(Agreement'!~is ~ii~er~}lnto. ~ llf:4ugust:
~91·2,.to
b~ome effective. a.s of 1\~;0losfug_-Daf~ (defined below)., bjr aoo- oeuveeri -&CORP, .INC~ (dba
?n~~atFamily.aoiii} with a ptt~ipai plare ·oN~t$iiw.s.s· at. 2-i=o.2 WesU3r.ov.c 1arkway1 :'Suite
ISO,. P.1~· dxo;,e,. Utah 84QS, (~'(}~~., .!NFL:Et1nl~· :tee (f~er.ly. ·troQWll :~ . l!~o_pl~
~h" Meclia;, L~): \,;itlt a_pjinc)P.t~ pJJ~~ ut~vsipcs.,c; ,t-JSS 1i.~:DQI~.QriY~ '.~~pod
Sh~s, CA ('iAsd~or")~:ontf /i.N~B.S~V:,C~~~nONS·, INC. wttii:,apitndipal )ilace af
business-at:3~ W-es:t S8DQ Nortli. Ptovh•. UT ("~~\gpoot1:

/b,.

lf6~1t41;,S
~ , QGP ~~ As§ignor ar~ P,aliics ta·ttfat ~nafu.Mati'.etf.ilf Jigre.e.mem: dar,::a.
April !O~ 2009 (tlie 'Vmetlni! QroomimJ1S)j~
.

~ . S~i~n l~ =tlf ~ ~~~ti.i,g 4.p~ent 'J"Cq\\tt~ tbal .neitht,r·-paity may,
assign its rlghtB ·ind. obllgati~ns- W1der tho· •Mat!afjbj Agr@Dltiit ~lJf. t&e: :paot: -'Mlfteii.
~nsent.6fthc otlier p.afty~ .mitf
Wfmlm.A-s~ As-s}gonr :and. ~gnee: ·l)atte: enferdt:_ lntQ lhnt cerlai~ i\ss~t ~lil:~.Att~qtttArit (~o '•Asaef £yrchsae· AJJ!Cmest'J}, pursuant·to wliich.Assighc'b will pui'chaa~ cemiin
~sets-of the Assignor.telittng fo .fdtnUy. lii$tocyi\3'Staroh w~bsitss @G::'\«s!~?;~and·
WAFJtBA.S, sul)}.eet(Q·$.¢;~utt~~ ~f~f~~~~~- Assis,ior.d~~ ito
assi~ ro .z\ssignc;e, -~ ~lgnee· ${~it~- t o · ~ ~ of ~i~Y i-fgbls ian.i(. nbl~ddJ!s
1Jmter ifte. Mamting -Agreement ,ofleetive is (Jt ifu;. c}• .<,f· ilie .~t Put.di!~ Undet f&.,
PuiGliasc Apment ("Closmgllam~?~:Mid
~ S , OQ.J?""w·wJJling to- pt0vide written'.! coris~ni:.ta. sucli.tissigntnenr,wbjeci to the~
temis.and co~ld"OSU of.ihis-..Agr~C11161\t..
-NOW; 11-mR:!FOR.E, b}. ~l~ ~fibe:foregolng and fhe .muttial :covenanu and
~~l>JJW·herelJi ·q9.~(necl.~d.for o'thw ~d·~iwiuable C<!>nsf&ratt"-<rn, fhe:~tpt 0.f wju"olj
are herebY. aclmowloogeo,·the_pafti6s:dgite"'«s follo~!
A4DD'DXAml:~
.1u~,1.~1,r1

.

.1.. ·Revised T.er-m.. fno.-:))~ titre~ ~ that :is.. ,of bie: ·Qlosm.g:· fja:tf!-. -~
¥ai:ketbtg .A~~t 5~~ be· an'ld.nnl)i fQ. r.~P.l~~ ~ :Ii~ ~~pee: IQf ~~Uo~ ?, of. 1!1~
h,farketing Agre~twttb thd'oilQ-wlng A~gcz

''This: A~enf .eo~en~ on th~ Bftcc<hr~-J:>~ ~'4 ~bw.l . ® ~ in effC9l
4
willl ~~oo.J.' s."f.•.i~s{:a:~~~ ) an~~~.l. f}l~.Ol~~f ~CW:~~.f« ~d1tional ope"!~ tenp.s,. Qf ot -wlii11n. comdµtte. :a. T¢mt, ·
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unless either. party.· pro;vides th~ otlwr· p~r with. written::notie.~ 0.6:il)ff-ren:~wnl it

J~tsi~ (60J. da~ pdor-_tt? tli~ en4 ~f.(1'eP.n/'

~ 2.
No. .Other Qba•nes· T"e t'Lo'\,.:,.;ts·
1ien::t.:· ·,liMl'-d
+I...+! 'ex~
'. ·h..rnt
... ..u.:~::...ertt
~
ft&"'i .&J~'>
.... ,,.t-6t·:~t.J.
µJS), 8Dl1.1-i~u .
expre$$lf -set forth in P.~gttqdi t :aooV.eJ all ~~ P.rQVist.Q~- ~(:,h(j MMcd:fr1g. _}t:gt~b\~t1
=incl~ all &hlbif$) shall.re!'-11.WJn. :tvtf fq~ an~ eff®.t.
.

.

. . -~ . ,., ....

.. ..vr

Wl'itten· Consent.. U.Pon Closing~ subj~t to-:th.ij i~Inent-ot.A~i~or-antl

3.

a1l tetinS eni:f oJ5n~on» of -lhls. ~:"1~ .au~. :~et ~tWjWJ.i. fSf. A~tgnea•~
~pt• ~hJl ~ tJn4 .~ti4\tJb~l-~f·tlte·M:~1c~g~~-!!Pl~t. .8$, l;tereP.Y·~~n.d~.. ,wu~h

-~SJ)~

to

ap~nt and aoocptanc~ is-:iiidica~ 'by the .o~les) :s~~ ·teiow~~OOF ~tij~tis'eins-to
the: ass'igrimerit· 0f all ·r}shls attd -o&Iigatio$· -<>.f i\$i~t CIX!(fer ·the- Madcethii A.&r"eement to
Asdgne~
·
1

.

S. ·lf?~ Ar:~P.111~,t~ Msisnor·~ .h.stRJJ~- ~Y ~~~9_se:~di ~g_retJ
:tha~ nolwiths~g: ~ lierein- to tiie :conmry, (tj ~&ifoi iiiklf rwn8itr db1fgated: and.
JJaa~_to_ OOF for.Cdmplian~ wlt.n·all t(.il'Di.S an.d ~fl~ o.t:tb:e M:-~tirtg •~.tnept.pxiot•ta.

.the Glos~g .Dn.te. 8P4' (Ii) ~gne.~= sfJatt ~ome J)bliJotea· 1"ld liable :h} O.GP i'Qt· ~Q.mpU~e
wf1h ~ te~ ~ ~dftJo:q~ o~ :~ lvJMlret.i!Jg: Jim-eom~nt•. -~ ~by aniend~ _as of and
.following ~e. Cl~sln$ tJ.9.re~ The p~··und~tl. antl IJP,<i ·ttiat Ati~gnor- jhall ~ ·no
responsib1UJrfor.tke pbtfgations.Msum~by ,t\ssign~ iJ of:~ fGtllt\'VlM. tbD. et~s~~

:,.
Exec1Jti.o;n~ This Cons~~t: for• ~lgnmenf may be :executed. ·Di ~h-ci ot. 'JllQm
countciparf.f, ~ t,£ whitb. 'sfui1i &e
°bet .an.o.risioaJ. bnt: ali ·o{wtiicb. l«gltttuit .shalt
:~<il'bta one· ai1d ·thtii· b& fntm.1tt1ent, ,md ibail ~n:ie: tsffeoif.fc. -~ir~ DlJO =9.1; ~'».
cpllllt~ Mve &ee~. •lJgnm..b;· ~ - pr,~· .P.UtJ~ ~ ~n~~= ty: th~ otfiey. ~ . •
facsifpj{e, .•#.fomiatQ~.o~~t~t!Onies,.gna~·QffbJii1~lgmnentshifl &ev.jJii\.and.hav.effie

:aeomea.:to

samd mtcO"-.ml eff~f·A$

amanuallrljgn~ miginm,

(SIGNAli.JRB:.PAG.B FOLLOW.SJ
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IN WITNESS: WflEaBO.Ps the .partjes·he.rero.. hav~ ~~t«J;thls· Co11~nt, t<Y hSSignment

us of.the day-and y~ nm.hercina~'\le ·wriften.

.•

·. .

l3yt

.

- ..

....i.•--.M~i:.....·-··~·~·•-·"__"_ _
. ~·- - · · - - ·-··

'N.amt:

Titfu:

·OE<=)
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Addendum C

Robert L. Jeffs, #4349
Randall L. Jeffs, #12129
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT, 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Email: rljeffs@jeffslawoffice.com
rzjeffs@jeffslawoffice.com
Attorneys for Plaintif.fs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Z-CORP, dba OneGreatFamily.com, a Utah
Corporation; and ONEGREATFAMILY,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company,
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
~

v.
ANCESTRY.COM, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and ANCESTRY.COM
OPERATIONS, INC., a Utah Corporation,

Civil No.: _ _ __

Judge_:---Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiffs Z-Corp and OneGreatFamily, LLC _by and through their counsel,
vi)

Robert L. Jeffs and Randall L. Jeffs of the law firm Jeffs & Jeffs, P .C., and for cause of action
against Defendants allege and aver as follows:

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff Z-Corp is a Utah corporation located in Utah County, State of Utah doing
business as OneGreatFamily.com.
2. Plaintiff OneGreatFamily, LLC is a Utah limited liability company located in Utah
County, State of Utah.
3. Defendant Ancestry.com, Inc. is a Utah corporation located in Utah County, State of
Utah.
4. Defendant Ancestry.com Operations, Inc. is a Utah corporation located in Utah County,
State of Utah.
JURISDICTION

5. The facts and circumstances of this Complaint involve a Marketing Agreement and
subsequent Consent to Assignment, which was created in Utah County, State_ofUtah.
6. The principle place of business for Z-Corp and OneGreatFamily, LLC is 1371 West_ 1250
South, Orem, Utah 84058.

The principle place of business for Ancestry.com, Inc. and

Ancestry.com Operations Inc. is 360 West 5800 North, Provo, Utah 84604.
7. This Court properly maintains jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§78A-5-102.
8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3•304.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

9. Z-Corp, its dba OneGreatFamily.com and subsidiary OneGreatFamily, LLC (hereinafter
"OGF") have an ongoing contractual relationship with Ancestry.com, Inc. and Ancestry.com
2
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Operations, Inc. (hereinafter "Ancestry") through a Marketing Agreement and subsequent
Consent to Assignment with Ancestry.

A copy of the Marketing Agreement is attached

herewith as Exhibit A. A copy of the Consent to Assignment is attached herewith as Exhibit B.
10. Initially, OGF entered into the Marketing Agreement with People Search Media, LLC
(who operated Archives.com) on April 20, 2009.
11. Later, in August 2012 Ancestry was in the process of acquiring Archives.com and during
this process, OGF and Ancestry agreed to the assignment of the Marketing Agreement to
Ancestry.' This agreement is reflected in the Consent to Assignment, Ex. B.
12. Ancestry continues to operate Archives.com.
13. The Marketing Agreement provided that there would be a cooperation of marketing
between OGF and Archives.com.
14. Specifically, the Marketing Agreement provides that, "OGF and [Ancestry] will use best
efforts in the performance of this Agreement." Ex. A.
15. The Marketing Agreement contemplates that once a customer has subscribed to
Archives.com, they will be presented immediately with an offer for a subscription to
OneGreatFamily.com.
16. this presentation requirement is to be made in the "paid area" following the signup for an
Archives.com subscription.
17. Throughout the several year history of the Marketing Agreement the "paid area" has been
mutually understood and treated by the parties as the area that immediately follows the entering
of a customer's financial information.
3
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18. Additionally, Archives.com presented and marketed OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions
on its Products Page.
19. The Marketing Agreement also provided for revenue sharing between OGF and
Archives.com; specifically for every OneGreatFamily.com subscription Archives.com would
receive 60% of the revenue and OneGreatFamily.com would receive 40% of the revenue.
20. After the August 2012 acquisition of Archives.com by Ancestry, there was a gradual but
significant reduction in the number of subscriptions to OneGreatFamily.com through
Archives.com.
21. Subscriptions to OneGreatFamily.com continued to lower until they reached a level that
was approximately half of the historical ·subscription levels, despite the fact that Archives.com
subscriptions were increasing.
22. After researching and investigating the matter, OGF discovered that subscription offers to
OneGreatFamily.com were frequently not being presented in the "paid area" of Archives.com.
23. Upon information and belief, Ancestry had gradually begun substituting advertiseme~ts
for their wholly owned subsidiary companies within the "paid area" rather than presenting a
subscription offer for OneGreatFamily.com.
24. In January 2014, OGF discovered that the subscription offer of OneGreatFamily.com on
the Archives.com Product Page had been entirely removed.
25. On April 27, 2014, OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions were suddenly additionally
reduced and OGF noticed that all offers for OneGreatFa~ily.com had been removed from the
"paid area" of Archives.com.
4
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26. Ancestry then began only offering subscription offers for their wholly owned subsidiaries
and associated entities in the "paid area."
27. The subscription offer for OneGreatFamily.com was restored to the "paid area" on April
29, 2014.
28. In subsequent discussions between the Parties, Ancestry informed the Plaintiff that
Ancestry.com had "reinterpreted" the Marketing Agreement and that they no longer were
-required to offer OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions in the "paid area," contrary to the Parties
historical practices and course of dealing.
29. On May 10, 2014 the OneGreatFamily.com subscription offer was again removed from
the "paid area" of Archives.com.
30. Once ·again, Ancestry then began only offering subscription offers for their wholly owned
subsidiaries and associated entities in the "paid area."
31. The termination of the OneGreatFamily.com subscription offer from the Archives.com
"paid area" resulted in a very substantial reduction in OneGreatFamily.com su~scriptions derived
from Archives.com.
32. To date there appears to be no marketing of OneGreatFamily.com anywhere in the
Archives.com "paid area."
33. During the same time, in May, 2014, Archives.com restored the OneGreatFamily.com

link to its Products Page, however it is only viewable after one logs into Archives.com under a
current Archives.com subscription.
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34. As the Parties have exchanged subscription and payment information for thousands of
customers, OGF has uncovered information that between 20,000 and 70,000 payments from
OneGreatFamily.com customer subscriptions are missing that are due from Ancestry.
35. The Marketing Agreement contains within it an Audit Rights provision that permits OGF
to audit Ancestry's "records to the extent reasonably necessary and solely for the purpose of
verifying [Ancestry's] records regarding customer sign-ups, cancellations, and other information
material to the terms of payment under the Marketing Program." Ex. A.
36. On the basis of the Audit Rights provision, OGF demanded an audit of Ancestry's
records regarding its Archives.com subscriptions, its OneGreatFamily.com subscription records,
and its·terms of payment records, including the ability to validate "paid area" subscription offers.
37. Ancestry refused. to honor OGF's request and instead offered only to allow OGF to
inspect some limited financial records that would not have enabled OGF to conduct a meaningful
and actual audit.

FIRST CAUSE. OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
38. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
39. OGF and Ancestry entered into· a contract when they signed the Consent to Assignment
and agreed to the terms of the Marketing Agreement to share marketing of their respective
websites.
40. OGF has performed its duties, requirements, and obligations under the Marketing
Agreement.

6 .
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41. Ancestry has breached its duties under the Marketing Agreement and Consent to
Assignment in multiple ways.
-42. Ancestry breached the "best efforts" provision of the Marketing Agreement when it
departed from the historic practice and course of dealing between the Parties an~ failed to
consistently offer OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions in the "paid area" after Ancestry first took
over the Marketing Agreement through the Consent to Assignment.
43. Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement when, on May 10, 2014 and continuing
through the filing of this Complaint, it completely removed OneGreatFamily.com offers from the
· "paid area" of Archives.com.
44. Ancestry breached the Marketing ~greement when it removed OneGreatFamily.com
subscription offers from the Archives.com Products Page for approximately 5 months.
45. Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement because, upon information and belief: it has
withheld payments for subscriptions that are due to OGF.
46. Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement when it refused to comply completely with
the tenns of the Audit Rights provision of the Marketing Agreement and indicated its intention to
only supply information to OGF in such a way that OGF would_ be prevented from conducting a
meaningful and actual audit.
47. As a result of Ancestry's multiple breaches, OGF has suffered damages in an amount to
be detennined by the Court but believed to be in excess of $8,900,000.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

48. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
49. Upon signing the Consent to Assignment of the Marketing Agreement, Ancestry
inherently undertook the obligation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to not
intentionally harm OGF's rights under the contract.
50. Notwithstanding this obligation, Ancestry intentionally sought to undermine and thwart
the full performance of the contract and failed to use their "best efforts" to market
OneGreatFamily.com.
51. This breach of the covenant occurred in multiple ways, including· not consistently
offering

OneGreatFamily.com

in the "paid area," and the eventual

removal

of

OneGreatFamily.com subscription offers within the "paid area" of Archives.com, and by only
making OneGreatFamily.com subscription offers viewable on the Archives.com Products Page
after one signs in as a current account member of Archives.com.
52. The int~ntional acts of limiting OneGreatFamily.com subscription. offers within
Archives.com by Ancestry prevented OGF from being able to receive the fruits of the contract.
53. This change of conduct by Ancestry towards OGF is inconsistent with the prior course of
dealing between the parties because Ancestry has opportunistically sought to reinterpret the
meaning of "paid area" for their own benefit and to the detriment of OGF.
54. Additionally, due to the nature of the Marketing Agreement, Ancestry is under an
obligation to promote and market OneGreatFamily.com, which purpose was undermined by
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Ancestry's overt and intentional efforts to put OneGreatFamily.com out of business and take
their market share by failing to market OneGreatFamily.com in the "paid area" and instead
opting to promote Ancestry's own affiliates and subsidiaries.
55. Ancestry's conduct of restricting OneGreatFamily.com advertising and subscription
offers from Archives.com

is

a deliberate attempt to deprive market share from

OneGreatFamily.com, and an attempt to hurt or potentially drive out of business
OneGreatFamily.com in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
56. Consequently as a result of these actions, Ancestry has breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing because they have not allowed OGF to receive their fruits from the
contract, have varied from the understood meaning of the contract, departed from the previous
course of · dealing that had been established by the parties, and by attempting to put
OneGreatFamily.com out of business.
57. OGF has suffered damages in an amount to be determined by the Court but believed to
be in excess·of$8,900,000.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conversion)

58. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-alleg~ the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
59. Ancestry exercised and continues to exercise dominion and control over subscription
funds to which OGF is immediately entitled.
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60. Ancestry's possession, use and conversion of these funds is inconsistent with OGF's
present rights to receive the subscription funds for the missing 20,000 to 70,000 subscriptions of
OneGreatFamily.com that are owed to OGF.
61. Under the terms of the Marketing Agreement, OGF has an immediate right to receive
payments from OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions and the refusal of Ancestry to make these
payments has resulted in OGF being deprived of the use and possession of these payments.
62. Ancestry's continued possession and use of the these funds is intentional, willful, and
without legal justification.
63. As a result of Ancestry's unlawful possession, control and conversion of these missing
subscription ·payments, OGF has suffered damages in an amount to be determined by the Court
but believed to ~e in excess of$3,000,000.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations)

64. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the preceding par:agraphs as if fully set forth herein.
65. Ancestry has intentionally interfered with potential subscribers ofOneGreatFamily.com.
66. Specifically, rather than marketing OneGreatFamily.com to potential subscribers within
the "paid area". of the Archives.com website as required under the Marketing Agreement,
Ancestry has marketed its own subsidiaries and related entities, from which it derived substantial
subscriptions and corresponding profits.
67. Therefore, Ancestry diverted prospective OneGreatFamily.com subscribers to its own
web services instead.
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68. This intentional interference with OGF's prospective economic relations was done for an
improper purpose. Namely, Ancestry had a contractual obligation to market OGF products, and
its failure and refusal to do so, together with its marketing of Ancestry products in the place of
OGF products qualifies as an improper purpose.
69. Moreover, upon information and belief, Ancestry undertook these actions with the
express purpose of harming OGF's business, reducing OGF's market share, and potentially
driving OGF out of business. Such intentions also qualify as an improper purpose.
70. Upon information and belief, the failure of Ancestry to perform its duties under the
Marketing Agreement constitute more than a feeling of ill-will towards OGF, rather the
predominant · purpose behind the breach was to cause injury to OGF by stealing potential
subscribers from OneGreatFamily.com and this purpose predominated over any other legitimate
purpose for Ancestry's actions.
71. Ancestry had an inherent duty in the Marketing Agreement to not interfere with potential
su~scribers that OneGreatFamily.com would receive through Archives.com. Rather Ancestry
had a duty to promote and market OneqreatFamily.com.

72. These actions of intentionally interfering with potential OneGreatFamily.com subscribers
have significantly reduced the revenues, total number of subscribers, and the value of OGF' s
business.
73. As a result of Ancestry's intentional interference, OGF has suffered damages in an
amount to be determined by the Court but believed to be in excess of$21,000,000.
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
{Punitive Damages)

74. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
75. The combined actions of Ancestry to breach and thwart performance under the Marketing
Agreement and prevent OGF from receiving the fruits of the contract constitute willful and
malicious conduct because they intentionally breached the clear and understood language of the
contract.
76. Additionally, by refusing to comply completely with the terms of the Audit Provision of
the Marketing Agreement Ancestry has not allowed OGF an opportunity to complete a
meaningful audit.
77. Such actions were taken intentionally, knowingly, and with conscious disregard for
OGF's rights.
78. As a result of this deliberate, willful, and malicious conduct, OGF is entitled to punitive
damages, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-20 I, in an amount to be determined by the
Court.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE PLAINTIFF prays for relief as follows:
1. For a determination by the Court that Ancestry breached the Marketing Agreement by;
departing from the historic practice and course of dealing between the parties in not consistently
offering OneGreatFamily.com subscriptions within the "paid area;" completely removing
OneGreatFamily.com offers from the "paid area;" removing OneGreatFamily.com from the
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Archives.com Products Page for approximately 5 months; withholding customer payments for
OneGreatFamily .com subscriptions and; refusing to comply completely with the terms of the
Audit Rights provision of the Marketing Agreement; and that such breaches caused damage to
the Plaintiff in an amount of approximately $8,900,000.
2. For a determination by the Court that Ancestry breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing through their deliberate attempt to reinterpret the meaning of "paid area,"
departing from the prior course of dealing, attempting to put OneGreatFamily .com out of
business, and preventing OGF to receive the fruits of the contract; and that such violation caused
damage to the Plaintiff in an amount of approximately $8,900,000.
3. For· a determination by the Court that Ancestry has converted Plaintiff's property; and
that such actions caused damage to the Plaintiff in an amount of approximately $3,000,000.
4. For a determination by the Court that Ancestry has intentionally interfered with
prospective economic relations of OGF; and that such actions have caused damage in an amount
of approximately $21,000,000.
5. For punitive damages, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201, in an amounfto be
determined by the Court.
6. For costs and attorney's fees.
7. For any other or further relief deemed by the Court to be appropriate under the
circumstances.

13

00000--2

DATED and SIGNED this 10th day of October, 2014.

JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
/s/ Robert L. Jeffs

Attorney for the Plaintiffs

@
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Addendum D

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

1 i/• ,/ lS Ml' .... Deputy
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Z-CORP., dba OneGreatFamily.com, a Utah
Corporation, and ONEGREATFAMILY,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company,

PEFtlJPANTS 1
RULING RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 140401466

vs.

ANCESTRY.COM INC., a Utah
Corporation; and ANCESTRY.COM
OPERATIONS INC., a Utah Corporation,

Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' November 13, 2014 Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint with accompanying memorandum. On December 24, 2014, Plaintiffs.

filed their Memorandum in Opposition ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.
Defendants then filed their Reply and Request to Submit for Hearing and Decision on January
12, 2015. The Court heard oral argument on March 9, 2015. Having heard oral argument and
having reviewed the parties' motion and memoranda, the Court now makes the following Ruling.

RULING
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to dismiss for failure
viJ

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a Rule l 2{b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the Court views the facts in the complaint as true, and determines "the plaintifrs right to

relief based on those facts." 1 In addition, under a Rule l 2(b)(6) motion this Court is not deciding
the merits of the case. 2 As a result, this Court is "concerned solely with the sufficiency of the
pleadings, and not the underlying merits of the case."3 Further, this Court recognizes that "[a]
dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted ... only if it is clear that a party is not
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim. "

4

On April 20, 2009, Plaintiffs and People Search Media, LLC, both of which operate
online family research websites, entered into a marketing agreement. Subsequently, in August
2012, Defendants, who also operate online family research resources, acquired People Search
Media, LLC, and consented to the assignment of the Marketing Agreement. Plaintiffs allege that
since Defendants took over People Search Media that Defendants have changed how they
perform under the Marketing Agreement. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have
breached their marketing obligations under the Marketing Agreement by failing to market
Plaintiffs at all. Plaintiffs argue that the obligatory language of the Marketing Agreement "shall
perform" obligates Defendants to market Plaintiff in a specific way. Defendants argue that the
Marketing Agreemen~ at issue here does not require Defendants to perform any specific
promotion, and that therefore Defendants are not in breach of the contract.

.

This case comes down to interpretation of the language of the contract. To withstand a
motion to dismiss on a contract claim,- a plaintiff must allege "( 1) a contract, (2) performance by
the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages."

5

Plaintiffs hav~ appropriately alleged the existence of a contract, performance, and damages.
1

State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ,I 42 {citing Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 1 8).
Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, 1 20.
3
Apotex, 2012 UT 36, ,r 42 (citing Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ,I 8).
4
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,624 (Utah 1990).
5
Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, 'if 14, 20 P.3d 388, 392.
2

2
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"

What remains is for this Court to determine whether Plaintiffs have appropriately alleged, or can
appropriately allege, a breach under the asserted facts.
When interpreting a contract, "the intention of the contracting parties is controlling." 6
Further, when a contract's language "is unambiguous, the intention of the parties may be
det~rmined as a matter oflaw based on the language of the agreement." 7 A contract's language is
only ambi~ous where "it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms or other facial deficiencies. " 8 The Court may only
"consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions," 9 when a contract is ambiguous.
Here, the Court finds the contract to be unambiguous, and so extrinsic evidence is
unnecessary. The phrase in the Marketing Agreement at issue here states:
Each party shall perform the following activities as the "Marketing Partner" at
10
their sole cost and expense, and under their own exclusive control.
This sentence consists of two clauses, an independent clause and a dependent clause.
11

First, "[a] clause is a group of words that includes a subject and a predicate." An independent
clause is different from a dependent clause in that "[a]n independent clause can stand alone as a
sentence, while a dependent clause must be accompanied by an independent clause."

12

Further, a

dependent clause can also be a restrictive modifying clause. A"[a] restrictive modifying clause
(or essential clause) ... is essential to the meaning of a sentence because it limits the thing it

6

7

Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 1J 18, 48 P.3d 918.

Id.
8
Id. at~ 19.
9
Id. at 4jJ 18.
to Marketing Agreement, at Exhibit "A", CJ 1.
11
University of Illinois, Grammar Handbook: Independent and Dependent Clauses,

http://www.cws.illinois.edu/workshop/writers/clauses/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
12

Id.

3
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refers to. The meaning of the sentence would change if the clause were deleted." 13
In this instance, the clause "Each party shall perform the following activities as the
'Marketing Partner,"' forms the independent clause. This is the clause that Plaintiff argues
includes obligatory language. Generally, "shall perform" is indeed obligatory language that.
imposes a duty upon a party, and would do so in this case were the sentence to end there.
However, in this case, this sentence includes the dependent clause "at their sole cost and
expense, and under their own exclusive control." This dependent clause is a restrictive modifying
clause, changing the entire meaning of the independent clause. This clause turns all exercise of
any activities referred to in the independent clause over to the "exclusive control" of the
exercising party, essentially negating the phrase "shall perform." Because each party maintains
exclusive control over any activities performed under the Marketing Agreement, each party
retains the right to perform any amount of marketing that the party chooses, including no
marketing·at all. Because Defendants have no affirmative duty to perform any marketing activity
under the Marketing Agreement at all, they cannot be in breach of contract for performing no
marketing activity.
Because Plaintiffs' causes of action all rely on the contractual relationship between
Plaintiffs and Defendants, Plaintiffs' causes of action are dismissed. The first cause of action,
breach of contract, is dismissed because, as was just explained, Defendants did not breach the
Marketing Agreement, and therefore Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under these facts.
The second cause of action, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

13

University of Illinois, Grammar Handbook: Restrictive and Nonrestrictive Clauses,
http://www.cws.illinois.edu/workshop/writers/restrictiveclauses/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
4
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likewise fails. Plaintiffs rely on the "best efforts" or "Good and Workmanlike Manner" 14 clause
to claim that because Defendants stopped marketing Plaintiffs' products, they failed to use their
best efforts in performance of the agreement. Here again, because Defendants retain exclusive
control over any marketing activity, Defendants had no obligation to do any marketing at all.
ViJ

Plaintiffs cannot invoke this covenant to "create obligati~ns 'inconsistent with express
contractual terms. "' 15 Even Defendants' previous course of dealings cannot invoke this covenant
to create new obligations inconsistent with express contractual terms. 16 Though Defendants in
the past may have marketed Plaintiffs in the way Plaintiffs_ prefer, that "does not itself establish a
binding legal covenant to [continue to] do so." 17 Thus, under the language of the contract,
Defendants' best efforts at marketing could include no efforts. Therefore, Defendants are not in
breach of contract under this clause either, and there has been no breach of this covenant.
The third cause of action, conversion, fails as well. Defendants argue that the economic
loss doctrine bars this claim. In Utah, "the economic loss doctrine bars all tort claims seeking
recovery for economic losses when the claims are not based on a duty independent of the
contractual obligations between the parties." 18Plaintiffs argue that the tort of conversion is not

vii

precluded by the economic loss doctrine because their claim of conversion is not based on the
Marketing Agreement. Plaintiffs argue that by failing to remit subscription funds to Plaintiffs,
Defendants have "co-opted the Plaintiffs' website and have made it available to individuals for
which Plaintiffs have not received subscription funds ... convert[ing] the Plaintiffs' website for
Marketing Agreement, ,r 2.
·
Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 2011 UT 64, f l 0, 266 P.3d 814 (citation omitted).
16
See Id at 1 15.
17
Id at115.
18
Anapoell v. Am. Express Bus. Fin. Corp., No. 2:07-CV-198-TC, 2007 WL 4270548, at •6 (D. Utah Nov. 30, 2007)
(unpublished).
14
15

5

000220

their own use and benefit." 19
This court finds that the economic loss doctrine precludes Plaintiffs' conversion claim.
First, after reviewing the Complaint, the court cannot find where Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
have co-opted Plaintiffs' website. The Complaint only outlines a claim that Defendants converted
subscription funds to which Plaintiffs are allegedly entitled. These subscription funds flow
directly from the Marketing Agreement and cannot be said to be extra-contractual in nature. This
claim appears in actuality to be a claim for consequential damages. Consequential-datnages are
part and parcel of a contract claim, and cannot be claimed in tort, clearly being barred by the
economic loss ~octrine. Further, even if Defendants claim that Plaintiffs co-opted their website
were in the Complaint, it would also fail as a matter of law. Plaintiffs provided Defendants
access to their website pursuant to the Marketing Agreement. Having done so, Plaintiffs cannot
now complain that Defendants have access to Plaintiffs' website. In any case, this claim also
clearly flows from the Marketing Agreement, and is thus barred by the economic loss doctrine.
Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of their conversion claim.
The fourth cause of action, intentional interference with prospective economic relations,
was dismissed without prejudice per stipulation of the parties.
The fifth cause of action, punitive damages, relies on the Marketing agreement which
allows punitive damages for breach of contract that is "a result of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. "20 Here again, because there has been no breach of contract, there is also no gross
. negligence or willful misconduct. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief for this claim.
19
20

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss 'the Complaint, at 14.
Marketing Agreement, 4l 4.
6

oobi19

~

IV. Conclusion

Therefore, because Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law, the Court grants Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss, and the following causes of action are dismissed with prejudice:
l. Breach of Contract
2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
3. Conversion

5. Punitive Damages
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action, Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations,
was dismissed without prejudice at oral argument on March 9, 2015. Counsel for Defendants is
directed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling.
·..,;;}

DATED this

/>~ day of April, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

7

000218

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
(;..;

I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, on the

_j_ day of April, 2015 to the following at the addresses indicated:

Mark 0. Morris (4636)
AmberM.Mettler(l1460)
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
15 West South Temple
Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Email: mmorris@swlaw.com
amettler@swlaw.com
Robert L. Jeffs
Randall L. Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS,P.C.
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
rljeffs@jeffslawoffice.com
rzjeffs@jeffslawoffice.com

Deputy Court Clerk
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Addendum E

Robert L. Jeffs, #4349
Randall L. Jeffs, #12129
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT, 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Email: rljeffs@jeffslawoffice.com
rzjeffs@jeffslawoffice.com

Attorneys/or Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Z-CORP, dba OneGreatFamily.com, a Utah
Corporation; and ONEGREATFAMILY,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,
V.

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT

ANCESTRY.COM, INC., a Utah
Corporation; and ANCESTRY.COM
OPERATIONS, INC.,.a Utah Corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No.:140401466
Judge: Fred D. Howard

COME NOW Plaintiffs Z-Corp and OneGreatFamily, LLC by and through their counsel,
Robert L. Jeffs and Randall L. Jeffs of the law firm Jeffs & Jeffs, P.C., and pursuant to Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 7, hereby submit the following Objection to the Defendants' Proposed Order
Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint (hereinafter
'Proposed Order').
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The Proposed Order omits a critical issue of importance that was before the Court and
which deserves the Court's attention. Not only did Plaintiffs bring a cause of action for breach of
contract on the theory that the Defendants had failed to appropriately market under the
requirements of the Marketing Agreement, but Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants had breached
the contract by failing to render payment to Plaintiffs for funds already received by Defendants
under the terms of the Marketing Agreement.
This cause of action for breach of contract is specifically alleged in paragraphs 34 and 46
of the Complaint. The Proposed Order also does not address Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract
on the theory that Defendants failed to allow Plaintiffs access to information in order to allow
Plaintiffs to conduct a meaningful audit under the Marketing Agreement. This cause of action for
breach of contract is specifically alleged in paragraphs 35, 36,' 37 and 46 of the Complaint.
Moreover, both of these causes of action were also addressed in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on pages 4, 8 and 9 of the memorandum, and
were raised by Plaintiffs at oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss.
The Court's Ruling makes no findings as to why either of these causes of action should be
dismissed and the Defendants' Proposed Order is likewise silent on these two causes of action.
Nonetheless, both the Ruling and the Proposed Order. dismiss all the causes of action in the
Complaint without specifically addressing these two causes of action. This is error, and therefore
the Plaintiffs object to the Proposed Order for these reasons.

2
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DATED and SIGNED this 21st day of April, 2015.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.

Isl Randall L. Jeffs
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
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